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DO SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS MITIGATE AUTHORITARIAN RULE? 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
G. Jason Smith 
December 6, 2010 
The famous oil baron' John Paul Getty once defined his secret to success in three 
parts, "Rise early, work hard, strike oil." This recipe, however, has not lead to political 
and economic success for oil-reliant, emerging market states. Rather than experiencing a 
resource blessing, these states have been plagued by a resource curse. This project 
introduces and tests my theory that sovereign wealth funds offer an exit to the resource 
curse and pathway back to the resource blessing. This theory is based on two 
observations I noticed during previous research on the subject: states with sovereign 
wealth funds boost occupational specialization and government transparency. Since both 
of these factors are believed to be necessary for democratization, then states with 
sovereign wealth funds should be less authoritarian. My findings suggest that the 
political transparency claim is true and that sovereign wealth funds do increase 
occupational specialization. However, the findings also suggest that occupational 
specialization is no longer a causal mechanism of the resource curse. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................. iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRA CT ................................................................................................................... v 
LIST 0 F TABLES ................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER I: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Oil ........................................................ 1 
Research Question .................................................................................................... 2 
Summary of Findings ................................................................................................ 4 
Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Research Subject ....................................................... 5 
Study Overview ........................................................................................................ 6 
CHAPTER II: The Political-Economy of the Resource Curse ................................ 9 
Resource Blessing ................................................................................................... 10 
The Economics of the Resource Curse ................................................................... 11 
Dutch Disease ......................................................................................................... 13 
The Politics of the Resource Curse ......................................................................... 15 
Empirical Testing of the Resource Curse ............................................................... 19 
Exits to the Resource Curse .................................................................................... 21 
Overview ................................................................................................................. 24 
CHAPTER III: Sovereign Wealth Funds ................................................................. 25 
Sovereign Wealth Funds Defined ........................................................................... 27 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Capitalization ................................................................... 29 
The History of Sovereign Wealth Funds ................................................................ 30 
Stabilization Funds ......................................................................................... ~ .. 31 
Public Pension Funds ........................................................................................ 33 
State-Owned Enterprises ................................................................................... 33 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Resource Curse .................................................. 36 
Occupational Specialization .............................................................................. 36 
Political Transparency ...................................................................................... 37 
Case Study of the United Arab Emirates ................................................................ 38 
ADIA and Political Transparency ..................................................................... 39 
ADIA and Occupational Specialization ........................................................... .41 
Overview ................................................................................................................. 44 
VI 
CHAPTER IV: Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................ 46 
Hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 47 
Dependent Variable ................................................................................................ 49 
Independent Variables: Base Model ....................................................................... 51 
Resource Curse Variables ................................................................................. 52 
Control Variables .............................................................................................. 55 
Independent Variable: Explanatory Variable .......................................................... 58 
Independent Test Variable: Hypotheses One and Two ........................................... 59 
Independent Test Variable: Hypothesis Three ........................................................ 63 
Overview ................................................................................................................. 69 
CHAPTER V: Inferential Statistics .......................................................................... 70 
Methodology ........................................................................................................... 71 
Occupational Specialization .................................................................................... 72 
Model One: Occupational Specialization ............................................................... 75 
Political Transparency ............................................................................................ 79 
Model Two: Political Transparency ........................................................................ 81 
Overview ................................................................................................................. 84 
CHAPTER VI: Conclusion ........................................................................................ 85 
Methodological Short Falls ..................................................................................... 86 
Suggestions for Future Studies ............................................................................... 88 
Overview of the Study ............................................................................................ 91 
REFEREN CES ............................................................................................................ 93 
APPENDIX A: List of Sovereign Wealth Funds .................................................... 1 03 
APPENDIX B: Data for SWF Dummy Variable ................................................... 105 
APPENDIX C: Industrial Activity .......................................................................... 106 
APPENDIX D: Service Sector Activity ................................................................... 107 
APPENDIX E: Oil-Reliant States 1992 to 2008 ..................................................... 108 
APPENDIX F: Mineral-Reliant States 1992 to 2008 ............................................. 109 
APPENDIX G: Oil-Reliant States 1970 to 2008 ..................................................... 110 
APPENDIX H: Mineral-Reliant States 1970 to 2008 ............................................ 111 

























LIST OF TABLES 
PAGE 
Regime Type ......................................................................................... 51 
Oil ......................................................................................................... 53 
Minerals ................................................................................................ 54 
Islam ...................................................................................................... 56 
Log Income ........................................................................................... 57 
Sovereign Wealth Fund ........................................................................ 59 
Men in Industry ..................................................................................... 61 
Women in Industry .............................................. : ................................ 61 
Men in Services .................................................................................... 63 
Women in Services ............................................................................... 63 
Political Transparency .......................................................................... 65 
Political Stability ................................................................................... 67 
Foreign Direct Investment .................................................................... 68 
Comparison of Means Test for Occupational Specialization ............... 75 
Occupational Specialization Regression I ........................................... 76 
Occupational Specialization Regression 11 ........................................... 77 
Occupational Specialization Regression III ......................................... 79 
Comparison of Means Test for Political Transparency ....................... 80 
Political Transparency Regression I .................................................... 82 
Political Transparency Regression II .................................................... 83 
Political Transparency Regression 111.. ................................................. 84 
Vlll 
CHAPTER I 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND OIL 
The end of World War II redefined global borders as former imperial colonies 
throughout the world gained independence from Europe. In the Middle East, this period 
marked a shift in the petroleum trade from colonial exploitation to self-control of natural 
resources. Rather than producing oil only for the parent state, nascent governments in the 
Middle East were now free to sell the state's oil on the global market to any country and 
at any price it wished. Development economists theorized that the revenues generated 
from the sale of natural resources would provide the capital necessary for these states to 
industrialize. If early proponents of modernization theory were correct, then 
industrialization would increase incomes and occupational specialization leading to the 
emergence of democratic governments in the region. Clearly these predictions did not 
come true. Today the Middle East is a region dominated by authoritarian regimes that 
remain economically reliant on oil exports. To explain the Middle East anomaly to 
modernization theory, academics developed a theory called the resource curse. 
As scholars debated the origin and impact of the resource curse over the past forty 
years, the fiscal management of resource-reliant states bifurcated into two types of 
countries: states with sovereign wealth funds and states without sovereign wealth funds. 
Traditional fiscal policy relied on commodity export taxes to fund the government, which 
left the state's finances exposed to the global commodity price cycle of booms and busts. 
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During the oil price spikes of the 1 970s, several governments established investment 
accounts with the excess revenue. 
The original goal of these funds was to promote fiscal stability or save for future 
government obligations. States hoped these funds would offer a buffer between the 
government's finances and declining export taxes when commodity prices decreased in 
the future. Over time, capital levels in these funds exceeded the amount necessary to 
accomplish its original objective, so states began to use these funds to accumulate wealth 
to be reinvested in the domestic economy. Today, the term sovereign wealth fund is used 
to describe these funds. Sovereign wealth funds are essentially state-owned investment 
vehicles funded by government revenues that seek to accumulate wealth for the state. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how these funds affect the domestic politics and 
economics of the states that create and benefit from them. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Academics produced an enormous volume of literature over the past four decades 
defining and explaining the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse and debating if 
an exit to the curse exists. Michael Ross empirically tested the various causal mechanism 
introduced by these scholars in 200 I. Ross concluded that the resource curse was a 
reality for both oil and minerals and that deindustrialization and the rentier effect are the 
causal mechanisms. His research also suggests that the resource curse is not path 
dependent, but rather the resource curse is an ingrained characteristic of resource-rich 
states that can be subjugated by careful management of resource wealth (Auty, 1994; 
Davis, 1995; Ross, 2001). 
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The goal of my thesis is to explore the political and economic effects that 
sovereign wealth funds apply on the resource curse by answering the following questions. 
"Do sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization and political 
transparency?" And "Are states with sovereign wealth funds less authoritarian than 
counterpart states without these funds?" I hypothesize that sovereign wealth funds 
promote occupational specialization and political transparency, leading to less 
authoritarian regimes in the states that create these funds. That is, sovereign wealth funds 
offer an exit to the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse by ingraining careful 
wealth management into the state governments that create the fund. 
According to Ross, the resource curse prevents democratization efforts in 
resource-rich states because a complex series of economic pressures prevent 
industrialization and occupational specialization from occurring. Sovereign wealth funds 
are state-owned investment vehicles funded by government revenues that seek wealth 
accumulation as the primary investment objective; thus, states with sovereign wealth 
funds have a separate source of investment capital that bypasses the complex economic 
issues that prevent the emergence of industrial and service sector employment that plague 
other resource-rich states. This essentially confirms the claim made by modernization 
scholars that resource-rich states get wealthy from the sale of oil without industrializing 
(Mahdavy, 1970; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; 
Krugman, 1987; Beblawi, 1990; Auty, 1990; Auty 1993; Auty 1994; Auty and Evans, 
1994; Ross 1999; Ross 2001). 
I will also argue that despite the opaque nature of sovereign wealth funds, states 
that operate these funds are forced to conduct government activities more transparently 
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than resource-reliant states that do not have sovereign wealth funds. The reasoning 
behind this theory is that sovereign wealth funds are increasingly investing capital in 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states where 
the fund is subject to the same national security disclosure laws that mutual funds and 
hedge funds must follow. Since increased levels of transparency are necessary for 
democratization to occur, I believe that states with sovereign wealth funds will have less 
authoritarian regimes. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
To test my theories, I compiled a pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset from 
information published by: Freedom House; International Labour Organization; Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009; Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute; Transparency International; United Nations Educational, Social, and 
Cultural Organization; World Bank, and the World Christian Encyclopedia. I performed 
difference in means tests on this data to examine the central premises that sovereign 
wealth funds promote occupational specialization and political transparency. 
Furthermore, multivariate regression analysis provides the statistical tools necessary to 
estimate what effect my hypothesized explanatory variables exert on regime type while 
controlling for factors associated with authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
To test the first claim that sovereign wealth fund states increase occupational 
specialization, I separated resource-reliant states into two groups based on whether the 
state had a sovereign wealth fund or not. The difference in means test suggests that 
sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization, but only within the service 
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sector of the economy. I performed another difference in means test to determine if 
resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds are less opaque than counterpart states 
without investment funds. To determine if increased transparency does mitigate 
authoritarian rule, I introduce a corruption variable into the basic regime estimation 
model. The difference in means test revealed that resource-reliant states with sovereign 
wealth funds are more transparent than counterpart states. 
I then developed an auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
regression model with panel corrected standard errors similar to the model Ross used to 
estimate regime type. Examining parameter variability within the model will tell us if the 
elevated levels of occupational specialization and political transparency generated by 
sovereign wealth funds actually produces less authoritarian regimes. The ARIMA model 
results confirmed my theory that political transparency mitigates the antidemocratic 
effects associated with the resource curse; however, the results contradict the assertion 
that occupational specialization still fosters democratization. It appears that states with 
sovereign wealth funds have greater levels of occupational specialization, but 
occupational specialization no longer influences regime type. 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT 
History has a tendency to repeat itself and sovereign wealth funds are no 
exception. Kuwait and Kiribati created the first dedicated funds in the 1950s. Oman and 
the United Arab Emirates followed suit during the oil price spike that occurred between 
the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1979 Iranian Revolution energy crisis. Other states 
followed this trend leading to the creation of several more funds during the 1980s and 
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1990s. The real tipping point for the sovereign wealth investment account concept 
occurred during the commodity price spikes of the last decade when another 32 funds 
were launched (Rozanov, 2005; Jens, 2007; Kirnmitt, 2008). By observing what affect 
the funds created before 1990 had on the political structure of the states that created them, 
we can determine if sovereign wealth funds mitigate the antidemocratic forces associated 
with the resource curse in the past. If this claim is true, then sovereign wealth funds 
could offer a pathway to careful wealth management capable of mitigating the 
antidemocratic effects of the resource curse in states with recently established funds. 
STUDY OVERVIEW 
The rest of this study is divided into five chapters. Chapter two covers the 
resource curse literature and the primary causal mechanisms uncovered by Ross. The 
chapter starts with an overview of the resource blessing literature published by 
developmental economists who hypothesized that the discovery of oil would lead to 
economic and political modernization including industrialization and democratization. 
The next two sections summarize the economic and political research into the resource 
curse that emerged in the 1970s when it became clear that industrialization and 
democratization were not occurring in the Middle East. The next section explores the 
causal mechanisms identified by Ross that provide the theoretical foundation to my claim 
that sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization that leads to less 
authoritarian regimes. The various resource curse theories also provide the control 
variables included in my statistical analysis. 
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Chapter three covers the change in sovereign wealth fund investment objectives 
that occurred over time and formally defines the term sovereign wealth fund. The 
chapter concludes with the introduction of my theory concerning the democratizing 
effects exerted by sovereign wealth funds. The basic premise is that sovereign wealth 
funds promote occupational specialization and encourage more transparent government 
finances, which lead to less authoritarian regimes. By providing citizens with the skills 
necessary to lobby the government and opening the methods by which governments 
finance fiscal expenditures, then the social and cultural changes necessary to foster 
democratization can emerge. 
Chapters four and five cover the statistical analysis I used to test my theory. 
Chapter four outlines the data I use for my statistical analysis and examines the essential 
premises of my theory using bivariate regression analysis. I test my hypotheses using a 
pooled time-series cross-sectional database I compiled. The descriptive statistics and 
bivariate regression analysis suggest that states with sovereign wealth funds are less 
authoritarian than states without these funds. 
Chapter five introduces my research methodology, presents the inferential 
statistics, and summarizes the empirical tests performed on my theories. Results of the 
statistical analyses were mixed. Support was found for the central claim that sovereign 
wealth funds exert a democratizing influence, but only through increased political 
transparency. The difference in means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds increase 
participation for both males and females in the service sector of the economy only; 
however, the regime-estimation model implies that occupational specialization is no 
longer a determinant of regime type. Evidence from the political transparency difference 
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in means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds are correlated with more transparent 
regimes. The regime-estimation model reinforces my claim that elevated levels of 
political transparency associated with sovereign wealth funds produce less authoritarian 
regimes. Finally. chapter six covers the conclusion of my research and suggests several 
future research questions regarding the internal effects of sovereign wealth funds. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The discovery of oil in the Middle East was originally considered a resource 
blessing as scholars hypothesized that the revenue generated by oil exports would usher 
in an era of political and economic development throughout the region. Development 
economists theorized that these states could reinvest capital generated by export taxes on 
oil to expedite growth of the domestic manufacturing sector. Modernization scholars 
assumed that corresponding increases in personal wealth and occupational specialization 
that naturally accompany the industrialization process would generate demand by citizens 
for democratic reforms. These predictions have not come to fruition; and today the 
Middle East remains economically-reliant on oil exports and dominated by authoritarian 
regImes. 
This chapter explores the evolution of political and economic research into the 
resource curse. The first section covers the resource blessing theory postulated by 
development economists. This section outlines the theory that a resource-rich state could 
use its commodity exports to fund economic development. The next two sections cover 
the various economic and political theories that emerged as evidence mounted that the 
discovery and sale of oil perpetuated authoritarian regimes and hindered industrialization. 
The fourth section covers Michael Ross's empirical testing of the different resource curse 
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theories, while the fifth section covers the causal factors of the resource curse identified 
by Ross and introduces the possibility for states to return to a resource blessing. 
RESOURCE BLESSING 
Former colonies were granted independence from imperial states following World 
War II. Development economists hypothesized that the colonial history of these nascent 
states would create a barrier to economic development. Because colonial rule prevented 
these countries from developing during the Industrial Revolution, these states lacked the 
manufacturing and labor efficiency necessary to compete against industrialized states in 
global markets. Decreased demand for exports from underdeveloped states would reduce 
foreign direct investment leading to an economic imbalance within the inchoate state: a 
surplus of labor and a shortage of investment capital. Therefore, governments had to 
increase capital inflows and employment opportunities before industrialization could 
occur (Viner 1952, Lewis 1955, Hirschman 1958, Spengler 1960, Baldwin 1966). 
Oil and other natural resources offered an obvious solution to the capital inflow 
and labor surplus problems. The rebuilding efforts in Europe increased demand for oil 
and raw materials that the incipient governments could exploit to fix its economic 
problems. Allowing multinational corporations to enter the resource extraction sector 
would increase foreign direct investment and employment. Moreover, governments 
could increase capital inflows by levying export taxes on the natural resources these 
companies removed. The revenue generated from those taxes could be reinvested in the 
domestic economy thereby promoting manufacturing endeavors separate. from the 
resource extraction sector. Labor force efficiency would increase as the manufacturing 
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sector developed eventually allowing the state to fully industrialize and compete for 
exports (Viner 1952, Lewis 1955, Hirschman 1958, Spengler 1960, Baldwin 1966). 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
A small minority of mainly structuralist economists levied the first criticisms 
against the resource blessing theory, thus laying the groundwork for future studies into 
the economic effects of the resource curse. Their criticism included three objections to 
the assumptions made by the development scholars. The first criticism asserted that 
wealthy industrialized states would collectively use its economic power during 
commodity price declines to tilt the balance of trade in its favor. As prices cycled over 
time, resource exporting states would experience a downward spiral in terms of trade 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). Economic research suggests that aggregate terms of trade 
for primary commodities have declined 0.1 to 1.3 percent per annum providing support 
for the argument that the degradation in terms of trade tend to inhibit economic growth 
(Ross, 1999). However, research conducted by John Cuddington undermines this 
conclusion in regards to oil. His study separately tested the terms of trade for twenty-six 
different commodities from the time period 1900-1983 and concluded that the terms of 
trade for oil remained trendless during this period (Cuddington, 1992). 
The second criticism argued that gains in industrial output separate from the 
commodity sector were unlikely if the process of oil and mineral extraction was 
dominated by multinational corporations that expatriated profits rather than reinvesting 
capital in the country (Hirschman, 1958). That argument has seldom been tested, because 
the trend among resource-rich states veered towards nationalization of the commodity-
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extraction sector before enough data was available to reach a valid conclusion. In fact, 
the rentier state literature assumes that authoritarian political leaders will inevitably act to 
capture the enormous revenues generated by commodity exports for their own usage 
(Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl, 1997; Vandewalle, 1998; Auty, 2001; 
Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Moreover, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal's 
research into the resource curse reveals that states with greater levels of private sector 
involvement in the commodity sector are more likely to democratize than counterpart 
states with greater state control over resources (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). 
The third criticism levied was that sharp cyclical price swings common to 
commodity markets would make future export taxes hard to predict and increase the 
monetary risk faced by foreign investors (Ragnar, 1958; Levin, 1960). Government 
nationalization of the resource sector once again prevented scholars from testing this 
claim; however, research into the effects oil and natural gas exports had on the 
Netherlands proved that volatile monetary policy can exert negative economic influences 
on resource exporting states similar to those hypothesized. The Dutch Disease model that 
emerged from this research found that an increase in commodity exports often exerts 
several complex economic effects that culminate in a concentration of capital and labor 
resources in the commodity extraction sector. Rather than promoting industrialization 
efforts, oil exports appear to cause deindustrialization that hinders economic 




Dutch Disease occurs when a state experiences a rapid increase in resource 
exportation that culminates in indirect and direct deindustrialization. I Indirect 
deindustrialization occurs within the labor market of the afflicted state by pushing 
workers out of the manufacturing sector into the resource extraction and service sectors 
(Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden, 1984). Increased demand for 
resources by world markets boost wages in the resource-extraction sector of the 
economy. Higher wages then attract skilled labor from manufacturing companies 
resulting in a shift of educated personnel from the industrial sector to the resource-
extraction sector (Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden, 1984). As 
the situation continues, the state's workforce loses its comparative advantage in tradable 
manufactured goods further promoting deindustrialization (Krugman, 1987). The 
spending effect further impedes labor movement into the industrial sector by increasing 
employment demand in the service sector as the state uses its new-found commodity 
wealth to boost government expenditures on public and social services (Ross, 1999; Ross 
2001). Increased demand for labor in those employment areas elevate wages and creates 
an incentive for unskilled workers to enter the service sector over the industrial sector 
(Krugman, 1987). 
Rising incomes increase internal demand for manufactured goods and services 
that leads to price escalation and domestic inflation (Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Van 
Wijnbergen, 1984). Inflation combined with elevated global demand for resources 
increase the real exchange rate of the state's currency resulting in direct 
I These are the most commonly used terms in the Dutch Disease literature. 
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deindustrialization (Van Wijnbergen, 1984). The process of direct deindustrialization 
unfolds as follows. An increase in the real exchange rate makes goods manufactured in 
the resource-rich state relatively more expensive on the global market than goods 
produced in countries without inflation problems. Higher exchange rates also make 
imports relatively cheaper than domestic production for the resource-rich state (Bruno 
and Sachs, 1982; Krugman, 1987). The resulting economic situation incentivizes the 
importation of manufactured goods over domestic production for Dutch Disease afflicted 
states. Over time, these circumstances erode the ability of the inflation-distressed state to 
export manufactured goods leading to direct deindustrialization. The cycle continues 
with each peak in commodity prices leaving resource exporting states ever more 
vulnerable to deindustrialization (Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; 
Corden, 1984; Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Krugman, 1987; Auty, 1990; Auty, 1993; Auty, 
2001). 
Concentration of labor resources in the commodity extraction sector of the 
economy does not produce the type of occupational specialization conducive to 
democratization because of the unique nature of that industry. Specifically, technical 
advances and worker productivity tend to increase slower in resource-extraction jobs than 
in the traditional manufacturing sector (Ross, 1999). Limited exposure to technological 
development prevents employees from developing the critical thinking skills necessary to 
challenge the government because workers are not required to continue their education 
beyond the initial learning process (Lipset, 1959; Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 1961; Ross, 
1999; Ross, 2001). The slow evolution of worker productivity inherent in the resource 
extraction sector tends to further hinder occupational specialization through a separate 
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process (Ross, 1999). To maximize worker efficiency under the Dutch Disease 
circumstances, employees are not shifted around to different jobs. As such, unions and 
other industrial groups do not form to protect workers. 
THE POLITICS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The political side of the resource curse emerged from attempts to explain why 
resource-rich states did not democratize despite increasing wealth. Classical 
modernization scholars hypothesized that industrialization would inevitably generate 
higher incomes and occupational specialization that promote the social and cultural 
changes necessary for democratization to occur in post-colonial states (Lip set, 1959; 
Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 1961). While these scholars did not address resource wealth 
directly, the implicit assumption was that rising incomes in the Middle East would have 
the same effect as elsewhere (Ross 1999; Ross, 200 1). Democratization efforts did not 
come to fruition during the 1960s and 1970s despite the fact that personal incomes and 
per-capita GDP rose dramatically in the region; and the persistence of authoritarian 
regimes challenged the theoretical relationship between wealth and democracies 
established by early modernization theorists. 2 
Modernization scholars, Middle Eastern experts, and developmental economists 
each offered competing theories to explain the Middle Eastern anomaly to modernization 
theory. According to Ronald Inglehart, "Is the linkage between development and 
democracy due to wealth per se? Apparently not: if democracy automatically resulted 
2 Israel and Turkey are the only two democracies in the Middle East today and neither 
state has a significant amount of natural resources. Wealth still appeared to be a 
necessary condition for democratization, but it certainly was not a sufficient condition. 
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from simply becoming wealthy, then Kuwait and Libya would be model democracies" 
(Inglehart, 1997: 163). Seymour Martin Lipset stated, "An extremely high correlation 
between aspects of social structure, such as income, education, religion, on the one hand, 
and democracy, on the other, is not to be anticipated even on theoretical grounds, because 
to the extent that the political sub-system of the society operates autonomously, a 
particular political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence 
of that form" (Lipset, 1959: 70). 
Many scholars pointed to the strong correlation between Islam and authoritarian 
rule as the reason why Middle Eastern states did not democratize (Skocpol, 1982; 
Sharabi, 1988; Lipset, 1994; Midlarsky, 1994; Waterbury and Salame, 1992; Hudson, 
1995; and Barro, 1997; Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001). The reasons for this correlation, and 
even the claim that Islam is the causal factor, remain open for debate. Several scholars 
claim that a combination of Islam and post-colonial rule hindered the formation of 
democratic rule in Muslim states (Clapham, 1985; Ayoob, 2005). By arbitrarily dividing 
the territory within Africa and the Middle East with little regard to historical and tribal 
history, those regions inherited socio-political issues that prevented the formation of 
democratic regimes in the area (Young, 1988; Ayoob, 2005). The predicament was 
further compounded by the simultaneous promises to Arabs under the Sharif-McMahon 
correspondence and to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration for control of the Palestine-
Israeli areas. This post-colonial malaise left newly formed states trying to discover its 
identity in a region filled with Pan-Arab nationalism and regional conflict (Monroe, 
1963; Ayoob, 2005). 
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Other scholars argue that Muslim exceptionalism accounts for the inability of 
Islamic states to democratize. Among these scholars, several theories emerged to explain 
why Islam is not generally compatible with democratic governance. One theory is that 
the adherence to religious dogma prevents the proper formation of political philosophy 
necessary for a state to democratize (Ramazani, 1966; Hunter, 2005). Other scholars 
suggest that Islam is naturally intertwined with monarchy rule (Curzon, 1892; Hunter, 
2005). A third school of thought argues that Islam is not inherently authoritarian, but 
rather subverts the social and cultural changes necessary for a state to democratize. This 
theory rests on the assumption that civil societies separate from the government and 
above the family level must emerge and unite a state's citizens before the social changes 
necessary for democratization could occur (Putnam, 1993). 
Middle Eastern specialists refused to accept Islam as the explanatory factor for the 
failure of democratization in the region. Instead, these scholars argued that the global 
economic structure inhibited democratization by creating rentier states in the Middle East 
(Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Beblawi, 1990, Lam and Wantchekon, 
1999). According to the economist David Ricardo, "Mines, as well as land, generally pay 
rent to their owners and this rent. .. is the effect and never the cause of the high value of 
their produce" (Ricardo, 1821: 590). Thus, rents are unearned benefits and rentier states 
are countries economically reliant on the unearned revenues paid by the sale of natural 
resources. Hazem Beblawi published four characteristics that define a rentier state. First, 
the rent situation predominates. Second, the economy must rely on a substantial external 
rent - and therefore does not require a strong domestic productive sector. Third, only a 
small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of the 
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rent. Fourth, and most importantly, the state's government is the principal recipient of 
the external rent (Mahdavy, 1970: 428; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987: 85). 
The rentier state theory can be viewed as the ideological inverse of the American 
Revolution: "There is no representation without taxation" (Beblawi, 1991: 10). Export 
taxes on oil generated enough revenue that the state did not need to levy internal taxes on 
its citizens to fund government operations; thus, citizens and civic institutions lacked the 
will to demand democracy (Luciani, 1990). Another way to view this concept is that 
citizens implicitly accept the cost of authoritarian rule in exchange for the benefit of 
paying no taxes (Entelis, 1976; Beblawi, 1987; Beblawi and Luciani, 1990; Shambayati, 
1994; Anderson, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998).3 Some scholars argue that governments 
actually use oil export capital to fund its military and mukhabarat (internal police forces), 
which are then used to stifle internal dissent and squash democratic institutions before 
they could assert their presence (Moore, 1966; First, 1980; Vandewalle, 1994; 
Shambayati, 1994). This addendum to the rentier state theory is commonly called the 
repression effect. 
A third explanation for the lack of democratization emerged based on the Dutch 
Disease literature. Economists noticed a peculiar trend that emerged during the 1970s oil 
price spikes. Instead of experiencing widespread economic gains, states reliant on oil 
exports endured deindustrialization throughout the decade. The Dutch Disease theory 
claims that rising oil revenues accelerate government spending leading to rapidly rising 
inflation rates. Inflation destabilized the state's currency increasing the monetary risks 
associated with foreign direct investment. The exchange rate risk was especially 
3 See also Charles Tilly, Phillip T. Hoffman, and Kathryn Norberg. 
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dangerous in economic sectors not affiliated with oil extraction further aggravating 
industrialization efforts (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden 
and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; Krugman, 1987). 
The Dutch Disease phenomenon was further exacerbated by increased 
government spending on public services and the nationalization of oil companies. Both 
of these actions increased the level of government spending relative to GDP, which 
magnified the crowding-out effect for private industry (Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden 
and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). By the early 1980s, the crowding-out effect and 
nationalization of oil companies virtually eliminated private industry in the Middle East. 
As private actors withdrew investment capital from non-energy industries, labor moved 
from general manufacturing to the oil sector. Thus, states were able to develop 
economically and generate wealth without industrializing (Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001). 
EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The resource curse theories were methodologically sound, but remained 
qualitative in nature and had not been quantitatively t~sted (Ross, 2001). Ross fixed that 
oversight by empirically testing the basic premise of the resource curse and several of the 
underlying assumptions present in different existing theories. He concluded that that 
resource curse claim was valid. The correlation between oil and authoritarian rule is 
present and statistically significant even after accounting for the presence of Islam (Ross, 
2001). Oil also hurt poorer states more than it hurt wealthier states, which means that 
even a relatively small amount of oil export revenue can hurt democratization efforts in 
relatively poor states (Ross, 2001). Ross also tested the regional claim and discovered 
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that the resource curse does exist outside the Middle East. The results suggest that the 
presence of oil hindered democratization efforts in Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Mexico, 
and possibly several Central Asian states (Ross, 2001). 
Concerning the various causal mechanisms, Ross found tentative support for the 
rentier, repression, and modernization effects (Ross, 200 1). Ross looked at tax rate and 
government spending to test the rentier theorists' claim that governments suppress 
democratic pressure by bribing citizens with low tax rates and welfare spending. 
Statistical testing revealed that lower corporate and personal tax rates are strongly 
correlated with more authoritarian governments, but the effect was only significant in the 
short run (Ross, 2001). The hypothesis that government spending dampens 
democratization was statistically significant in the short and long term, though, adding 
credence to the spending effect claim (Ross, 2001). Testing the repression effect 
revealed a statistically robust correlation between military spending and authoritarianism 
in oil-reliant states, but there was little support for the claim that these states used the 
military to physically repress its citizens. Ross concluded that military spending rose 
because the strategic value of oil required strong militaries for defensive efforts (Ross, 
2001). 
Ross tested the modernization scholars claim that deindustrialization diminished a 
population's desire for democracy. He concluded that claims made by modernization 
scholars were essentially valid. There is a strong correlation between deindustrialization 
and authoritarian regimes; however, the results could be interpreted two ways. 
Modernization theory is valid, but the only real effect is that resource wealth inhibits 
occupational specialization outside of the oil sector (Ross, 2001). Another possible 
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interpretation suggests that the rentier effect and modernization effect occur 
simultaneously in oil-reliant states (Ross, 2001). Widespread industrialization does not 
occur because there is no demand for labor outside of the oil sector; however, this 
situation is not a problem for the state because the government can disperse oil wealth via 
welfare spending without industrializing. Since the public never develops the cultural 
skills associated with economic modernization, the system inherently dampens internal 
dissent and demands for democracy (Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001). 
EXITS TO THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Ross concluded that the presence of oil and other natural resources exert negative 
pressures on democratization, but he also determined that the resource curse was not path 
dependent (Auty, 1993; Auty, 1994; Auty, 2001; Ross, 2001). He did not expound on 
what an exit to the resource curse might look like, but his regression results suggest that 
escape from the trap was theoretically possible (Ross, 2001). This finding contradicts 
previous research that asserts the only wayan oil-rich state could exist as a democracy is 
if that state was a functioning democracy at the time oil was discovered (Beblawi, 1987; 
Beblawi and Luciani, 1990). Any state that was not had not fully democratized by the 
time oil was discovered would remain intrinsically plagued by the poor economic growth 
and weak civic institutions that perpetuate authoritarian regimes. 
What options exist for an exit from the resource curse? Samuel Huntington 
defined three methods for democratic transition called: transformation, transplacement, 
and replacement. Transformation occurs when elites push for change. Transplacement 
takes place when joint action from the government and opposition groups foster 
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democratization. Replacement occurs when opposition groups act alone to overthrow the 
authoritarian regime and implement a democratic government (Huntington, 1991). Given 
the unique situation presented by the resource curse, transformation and replacement are 
highly unlikely to occur in resource-reliant states. That leaves transplacement as the only 
logical escape for the resource curse. 
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2006) argue that Beblawi's fourth characteristic of 
rentier states is the determinant factor for transplacement. Their approach differs from 
previous research by treating the structure of the oil industry as an endogenous rather 
than an exogenous variable. When the state is the primary recipient of oil revenue, 
government officials inherently increase their authority over the entire oil institution from 
the extraction process to revenue collection. This situation creates an incentive for the 
state actors overseeing the distribution of wealth to focus solely on the short-term with 
little regard for the long-term consequences of their actions. This situation ingrains 
political corruption that thwarts the emergence of civic institutions. The failure to expand 
civic institutions inhibits the formation of civil society, thus preventing the occurrence of 
transplacement events (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). 
Furthermore, privatization of the resource sector in authoritarian regimes is rare 
because external political pressures encourage greater state-ownership of resources 
(Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the global political structure encourage policy convergence among resource 
producing states by rewarding compliant governments with oil prices higher than free-
market equilibrium would produce. Adherence to the status quo hinders the formation of 
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political competition and alternate revenue streams thus fomenting internal constraints on 
the oil institution that perpetuate authoritarian rule (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). 
The entrance of private actors in the oil institution mitigates the antidemocratic 
effects of the resource curse through two channels. First, states that allow private 
corporations to enter the oil sector create an avenue for wealth dispersion separate from 
the government (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Diminished power over the 
distribution of oil wealth means the state must develop revenue streams separate from oil 
export taxes. If the only way to generate more government revenue is through internal 
taxes, then the relationship between social welfare benefits and the cost of authoritarian 
rule will shift out of equilibrium. Transformation events could theoretically emerge from 
this imbalance. 
The second channel offers a more direct route to transplacement. When private 
owners earn a stake in the outcome of the oil sector, the oil institution offers an economic 
incentive for private actors to engage the government in negotiations over resource 
property rights and taxes (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). According to Jones Luong 
and Weinthal, "Thus, privatization to domestic actors offers an alternative path out of the 
'resource curse' because it creates an incentive for both state and non-state actors to 
bargain over and eventually establish the formal rules of the game" (Jones Luong and 
Weinthal, 2006). Transplacement should naturally emerge under these circumstances. 
Strong property rights must exist before these circumstances can promote 
transplacement. Private corporations that enter states where weak property rights prevail 
face an investment risk that cannot be mitigated by normal profit margins (Ross, 1999). 
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However, multinational resource extraction companies can maintain operational 
profitability by hiring rebels, gangs, or private militia to enforce its property rights (Ross, 
1999). This situation creates a unique economic structure conducive to slow industrial 
growth and a booming resource extraction sector (Chicilnsky, 1994; Ross, 1999).4 
Resource export taxes surpass other forms of government revenue over time further 
enhancing the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. These effects are 
compounded because states with poorly enforced property rights tend to gain a 
comparative advantage over other states in export markets (Chichilnsky, 1994). 
OVERVIEW 
Ross settled many of the academic disputes found in the resource curse literature. 
Empirical testing validates the existence of a statistically robust relationship between 
economic reliance on resource exports and authoritarian regimes; thus confirming the 
basic premise of the resource curse. The regression models also suggest that oil export 
revenues inhibit occupational specialization and increase government spending resulting 
in deindustrialization and the persistence authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). Strictly 
speaking, these results confirm that the modernization and rentier effects are the causal 
mechanisms of the resource curse. This chapter also introduced evidence that the 
resource curse is not path dependent and can be overcome by careful management of the 
wealth associated with resource exports (Auty, 1994; Ross, 2001; Jones Luong and 
Weinthal,2006). The next chapter introduces my theory about how states might escape 
from the resource curse. 
4 According the Ross, the correlation between slow economic growth and resource export 
dominance is spurious. Both are a result of poorly enforced property rights (Ross, 1999). 
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CHAPTER III 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
Sheikh Abdullah AI-Salem AI-Sabah of Kuwait charted the first sovereign wealth 
in 1953 (Kimmitt, 2008). The primary investment objective of the Kuwait Investment 
Authority was to reduce the state's economic dependence on a single non-renewable 
resource and promote domestic economic diversification. The concept was ahead of its 
time, but caught on quickly during the 1970s oil price spikes. Three more national funds 
were chartered between the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
energy crisis: Singapore (Temasek Holdings, non-commodity), the United Arab Emirates 
(Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, oil), and Oman (State General Reserve Fund, oil).5 
Another four were launched in the early 1980s, bringing the total to nine funds. 6 The 
idea reemerged during the spike in oil and commodity prices that started in the late 1990s 
5 The United Arab Emirates created their flagship AIDA fund during this time. The fund 
was officially chartered by Abu Dhabi; however, the fund essentially served as the United 
Arab Emirates' federal fund until 2007 when the Emirates Investment Authority fund was 
created. Several U.S. states and a Canadian province also have sovereign wealth funds. 
Since U.S. states and Canadian provinces are not strictly sovereign, these funds are 
excluded from this study. 
6 The nine funds are the Kuwait Investment Authority (Kuwait), Revenue Equalization 
Reserve Fund (Kiribati), Temasek Holdings (Singapore), Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (United Arab Emirates), State General Reserve Fund (Oman), Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation (Singapore), Brunei Investment Agency (Brunei), 
International Petroleum Investment Company (United Arab Emirates), and the Social and 
Economic Stabilization Fund (Chile). 
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leading to the creation of at least 32 new funds since 2000 (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).7 
Today, there are as many as 40 different funds representing 34 different states (Kimmitt, 
2008).8 A list of these funds can be found in Appendix A. 
Currently these funds control an estimated $2 - $3 trillion in assets, a number that 
could grow by as much as $1 trillion a year for the foreseeable future (Rozanov, 2005; 
Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). Furthermore, Morgan Stanley analysts estimate that 
sovereign wealth funds could potentially manage as much as $12 trillion in assets by 
2015 (The Economist, 2008).9 Individual funds range in size from $400 million in 
Kiribati's fund to $875 billion controlled by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 
Fund (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).10 Given these facts, researchers should not ignore the 
future impact sovereign wealth fund managers will apply to domestic and global 
economic systems. 
The first section of this chapter delineates the term sovereign wealth fund. The 
U.S. Treasury Departments official definition is the most widely used and appropriate 
characterization of sovereign wealth funds for this paper. The next section briefly 
describes how sovereign wealth funds are capitalized. Current literature divides funds 
7 Jens reported that 31 funds have been created since 2000 (Jens, 2007). Since the 
publication of the article, Saudi Arabia has announced the creation of a new fund 
( www.sovereignwealthinstitute.com ). 
8 Estimates vary based on the different definitions of sovereign wealth funds and how the 
assets for non-transparent funds are estimated. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 
which offers the broadest definition and counting scheme, claims that there are now 50 
separate national funds that are actively managed. 
9 To put this in perspective, hedge funds managers control $1.7 trillion in assets, while 
pension funds and mutual funds collectively manage about $53 trillion in assets (Jens, 
2007; Kimmitt, 2008). 
10 Jens states that the United Arab Emirates had three separate sovereign wealth funds 
(Jens,2007). Accordin'g to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the UAE now operates 
at least seven separate sovereign wealth funds (www.sovereignwealthinstitute.org). 
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into commodity and non-commodity funded. The third section covers the different types 
of sovereign wealth funds. And the final section introduces my hypotheses about how 
these funds promote democratization by cultivating occupational specialization and 
political transparency. 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS DEFINED 
The idiom sovereign wealth fund was first used in 2005 by Andrew Rozanov for 
an article published in the Central Banking Journal (Rozanov, 2005). Prior to 2005, the 
terminology sovereign wealth management was generically used to refer to the four 
different types of sovereign wealth investment vehicles: official reserve funds, 
stabilization funds, public pension funds, and state-owned enterprises. The term 
originated because a number of official reserve funds, stabilization funds, and public 
pension funds had accumulated far more capital than was required for its original 
investment objectives. The high opportunity costs of idling excess capital encouraged 
many fund managers to invest accumulated wealth in less-liquid, higher growth 
investments. Rozanov's article explored this trend and proposed that the new moniker 
sovereign wealth funds be introduced to describe funds that had out-grown its original 
mission (Rozanov, 2005). 
What is a sovereign wealth fund? According to the U.S. Treasury Department, 
sovereign wealth fund are defined as: "[G]overnment investment vehicles funded by 
foreign exchange assets and managed separately from official reserves" (Kimmitt, 2008: 
122). A sovereign wealth fund is essentially a state-owned investment account funded by 
excess government revenues with the investment objective of seeking larger capital gains 
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than official reserve funds (Rozanov, 2005; Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). Notably, 
sovereign wealth funds are differentiated from traditional official reserve funds, public 
pension funds, and stabilization funds by the investment objective of the fund. 
The U.S. Treasury Department definition specifically separates sovereign wealth 
funds from official reserves funds, because of the difference in investment objectives 
between the two. Official reserve funds seek to protect against finance payment 
imbalances and offer a buffer against exchange rate volatility. With this objective in 
mind, official reserve funds typically invest in highly liquid securities that offer safer 
returns (Kimmitt, 2008).11 The primary investment objective of sovereign wealth fund 
managers is to seek higher returns than official reserve funds. Thus, "[Sovereign wealth 
fund] managers typically have higher tolerance for risk and seek higher returns than do 
official reserve managers" (Kimmitt, 2008: 127). To accomplish this objective, fund 
managers typically invest in stocks, corporate bonds, real estate, and other financial 
instruments or investments (Jen, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). 
Sin~e sovereign wealth funds are officially separated from official reserve funds, 
its activities are not subject to the International Monetary Fund's transparency guidelines. 
Therefore, information about the exact source of capital and investment objective is not 
published for most funds. 12 The lack of transparency exhibited by sovereign wealth 
funds compelled numerous academic debates over potential ulterior motives given to 
fund managers by state governments. This argument shifted to the political and public 
II Official reserve funds are typically managed by a state's monetary authority, which is 
usually the state's central bank (Rozanov, 2005). Official reserve funds typically invest 
in very safe, highly liquid assets such as government bonds (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). 
12 Sovereign Wealth Funds are still required to follow national security laws, including 
requests for disclosure statements, requested by states where the fund invests assets. 
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spheres following the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company's (CNOOC) attempted 
buyout of Unocal and the Dubai World's Ports deal. Quarrels over how these proposed 
merges would affect national security raged in Congress and on the front pages of 
newspapers. The heated nature of this controversy generated a plethora of news and 
academic articles debating how sovereign wealth funds affect global political structures. 
As such, this subject matter has been extensively covered by academics and journalists 
alike. The internal political effects of sovereign wealth funds have thus far been left out 
of the literature. This is an oversight I hope to remedy in this thesis. 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND CAPITALIZATION 
Despite the lack of transparency, there is enough information available to separate 
funds into two broad categories based on general funding sources. These classifications 
are commodity and non-commodity capitalized funds. Commodity funds include both 
mineral and oil capitalized funds, while most non-commodity funds are created with 
excess export taxes levied on manufactured goods. This classification just recently 
emerged, because before 1993 Singapore owned the only non-commodity capitalized 
fund. Prior to this classification, investment funds were typically called either oil or 
mineral funds (Rozanov, 2005). Over the last decade 12 non-commodity funds 
originated as export-oriented industrializing states followed the same path used by 
resource exporters to achieve higher returns on excess currency reserves (Rozanov, 2005; 
Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). There are currently 16 non-commodity funds in operation; 
however, commodity capitalized funds still account for two-thirds of all sovereign wealth 
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funds as of 2008 (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). Whether or not non-commodity funds 
have the same effect commodity funds remains to be seen. 
THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
Classifying sovereign wealth funds based on investment objectives is a difficult 
project for several reasons. Lack of adherence to IMF transparency guidelines means few 
funds publish investment objectives or strategies. Even if the objective can be implicitly 
discovered, funds occasionally shift objectives in reaction to changes in the state's 
finances or global financial markets. Sorting sovereign wealth funds by investment 
strategy is even more difficult. Just as every state has its own foreign policy tailored to' 
the unique nuances of its circumstances, each sovereign wealth fund has a different 
investment strategy customized to match the state's specific fiscal and monetary position. 
Despite these setbacks, scholars identified three types of wealth management 
funds based on the original investment objective: stabilization funds, public pension 
funds, and state-owned enterprises (Rozanov, 1995; Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). There 
are two things to remember about this taxonomy. The first thing to keep in mind is that 
wealth management funds start with these objectives. As the fund matures over time, 
capital levels surpass the threshold for fulfilling the original fund objective. This is the 
point that wealth management funds turn into sovereign wealth funds (Rozanov, 2005; 
Kimmitt, 2008).13 Second, every established sovereign wealth fund seeks higher returns 
than the state's official reserve funds (Kimmitt, 2008). 
13 An agreed upon naming scheme for funds based on their investment objectives has yet 
to emerge in the literature. For this paper I will use the names offered by Robert Kimmitt 
because these names most clearly define the fund,s objectives and appear to be the most 
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STABILIZATION FUNDS 
Official reserve funds and stabilization funds have the same basic objective: to 
buffer a state's economy against macroeconomic volatility. 14 The difference between the 
two is how they promote stability. Official reserve funds invest in foreign currencies 
which the state can use to fortify monetary stability during inflationary periods. 
Stabilization funds take more risks than official reserve funds, but tend to invest in safer, 
more liquid assets than sovereign wealth funds. Common investments include low-risk, 
income-oriented asset classes such as high-yield bonds and blue-chip stocks. 
Stabilization funds first appeared between the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 
1979 Iranian Revolution energy crisis. It was during this period that Oman and the 
United Arab Emirates followed the lead set by Kiribati and Kuwait by creating wealth 
management funds. 15 The new funds differed from those established by Kuwait and 
Kiribati in that the fund was originally charged with the task of promoting fiscal 
stabilization rather than saving for future generations. 16 
The theoretical genesis of the stabilization fund concept is the economic axiom: 
"Make hay while the sun shines." According to Arrau and Claessens, "During periods of 
high commodity prices - and high exports earnings - the country would accumulate 
widely used terms. Funds that seek macroeconomic stability will be referred to as 
stabilization funds. Funds that invest for future generations will be called public pension 
funds. Funds that promote domestic industries will be referred to as sovereign wealth 
enterprises. 
14 These two names are commonly substituted for each other in the literature. For this 
paper, official reserves are funds managed by central banks and typically do not invest in 
anything other highly liquid assets that can be used to balance monetary stability. 
15 This trend has apparently been repeated over the past decade. Most of the sovereign 
wealth funds created during this period have fiscal stabilization listed as the primary 
investment objective. 
16 The funds established by Kiribati and Kuwait were originally created as public pension 
funds, but both funds undertook actions to increase fiscal stability during the 1970s. 
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foreign assets which it would draw down in periods of low commodity prices" (Arrau and 
Claessens, 1992: 3). The fund invests excess revenues in relatively safe asset classes 
during oil price booms. During the price bust section of the cycle, the government 
withdraws capital from the fund to bolster the domestic economy. The end goal is to 
stimulate fiscal stability throughout the commodity boom-bust cycle. 17 
As the funds grew in size during the 1980s and 1990s, increasing national wealth 
displaced fiscal stabilization as these funds, primary investment objective. The optimal 
short-term size of a stabilization fund is less than one month's exports, while the optimal 
long-term size should be much smaller (Arrau and Claessens, 1992). The opportunity 
costs of idling capital in excess of this amount are too high for most states to endure for 
an extended period of time. Following the Persian Gulf Crisis, the average stabilization 
fund contained capital equal to about four months worth of exports; and the pace of 
capital accumulation accelerated during the global stock market boom of the late 1990s 
(Arrau and Claessens, 1992). 
It was during this time period that the tipping point between wealth management 
and sovereign wealth funds was surpassed. With opportunity costs rising and no end in 
sight for sky-high commodity prices, many of the traditional wealth management funds 
like stabilization funds added wealth accumulation to the fund's investment objectives 
(Rozanov,2005). By the end of the 1990s, most established funds had made the full 
transition from wealth management to wealth accumulation. This trend continued during 
the first decade of the new century as fund asset levels and government export tax 
17 The line between the two is further blurred because stabilization funds will 
occasionally act to promote monetary stability if such actions help to promote fiscal 
stability. The reverse does not hold true, though, as official reserve funds almost never 
attempt fiscal stabilization. 
32 
receipts rapidly increased in response to emerging market demand for commodities to 
fuel industrialization efforts. 
PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS 
"Public pension funds are investment vehicles funded with assets set aside to meet 
the government's future entitlement obligations to its citizens" (Kimmitt, 2008: 120). 
Most public pension funds were initially funded by excess capital from official reserve or 
stabilization funds. Public pension funds have not traditionally met the definition of 
sovereign wealth funds for two reasons: public pension funds are denominated in local 
currencies and these funds traditionally did not invest in foreign or riskier assets. The 
line between the two blurred as public pension funds moved capital abroad to reap the 
benefits offered by greater asset allocation and diversification (Kimmitt, 2008). Like 
stabilization funds, many public pension funds turned into wealth accumulation funds as 
its portfolio grew well beyond the capital levels necessary to fund the state's future 
obligations. I8 Today, mature funds of both types seek wealth accumulation as the 
primary investment objective while funding future generations and promoting fiscal 
stability are now secondary goals. 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
As defined by Kimmitt, "State-owned enterprises (SOES) are companies over 
which the state has significant control, through full, majority, or significant minority 
ownership" (Kimmitt, 2008: 120). The primary objective of state-owned enterprises has 
traditionally been the promotion of domestic industries, but these funds have typically 
18 There is another implicit difference between sovereign wealth funds and public pension 
funds not covered in the literature. Public pension funds have a specific goal for funding 
future generations or government obligations, whereas sovereign wealth funds often have 
the more nebulous goal of increasing national wealth. 
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been allowed to invest in foreign opportunities if the state believed that investment would 
achieve the desired goal of domestic development (Kimmitt, 2008). State-owned 
enterprises have commonly targeted oil companies, particularly companies involved in 
the extraction of oil (Mahdavi, 1970; Schaefer, 1983; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl, 
1997; Vandewalle, 1998; Auty, 2001; Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). But these 
enterprises have been chartered for other reasons too. For example, Singapore's Temasek 
holding company was created to take advantage of the state's unique geographic 
importance as a transshipment point. 
The rentier state literature on this subject assumes that oil and mineral wealth is 
always state-owned by necessity (Mahdavi, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl, 
1997; Vandewalle, 1998; Auty, 2001; Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Nationalization 
of commodity wealth was prevalent from the 1950s to 1970s as many oil and mineral rich 
states seized control of commodity extraction companies under the assumption that the 
government was the only entity that possessed the enough capital resources to continue 
commodity extraction (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Rather than reinvesting tax 
revenues and capital generated by these ventures to promote industrialization efforts, 
governments used it to nationalize all of the corporations in the resource sector via state-
owned enterprises. Thus, the de-facto goal of this form of sovereign wealth management 
was to give the government full control over the entire resource sector. 
The research conducted by Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal give 
credence to the claim that greater levels of private ownership over resources correlates 
with more democracy, while greater state-control correlates with more authoritarian rule 
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(Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006).19 In other words, state-owned enterprises contribute 
to the resource curse because the process of nationalization has three harmful effects on 
developing states (Ross, 1999). Foreign multinational corporations insulate developing 
states from export instability. After the nationalization process, this buffer disappears 
leaving the governments of these states exposed to market shocks (Levin, 1960; Schaefer, 
1983). Another side-effect of the nationalization process is the relaxation of fiscal 
constraints that often lead to excessive borrowing for the resource-reliant governments 
(Kornai, 1986). Finally, state-owned enterprises often lack access to foreign direct 
investment and external technical assistance making parastatal oil corporations 
notoriously inefficient and incapable of boosting productivity (Ross, 1999). 
State nationalization of the commodity extraction sector operating within its 
borders was the typical model for state-owned enterprises until the past decade. China 
redefined the model in its search for new commodity sources. Since China does not have 
particularly large oil reserves, the central government sought external oil supplies to 
fulfill its rapidly growing demand. As such, China recently acquired several foreign 
corporations through its own state-owned oil companies: China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
(Lewis, 2007).20 The primary goal for Chinese oil corporations appears to be the 
promotion of China's growing manufacturing sector. Thus, China's state-owned oil 
companies appear to be one of the only state-owned enterprises that successfully achieve 
the goal of promoting domestic industrialization. 
19 See Chapter 2 for more details. 
20 The Chinese government has not publicly disclosed its intention for these acquisitions; 
however, the general consensus is that China is purchasing these companies to shore up 
oil supplies for its rapidly growing manufacturing sector (Lewis, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). 
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SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Richard Auty asserts that the resource curse is not an iron-clad law, but rather the 
curse is an ingrained characteristic of resource-rich states that can be subjugated by 
careful management of resource wealth (Auty, 1994; Davis, 1995).21 My theory is that 
sovereign wealth funds ingrain the characteristics of careful wealth management into the 
government, thus mitigating the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. In 
particular, I argue that sovereign wealth funds elevate occupational specialization and 
unveil government finances promoting transparency in resource-reliant states. 
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION 
Michael Ross's results can be construed two ways. The first interpretation 
confirms the basic validity of modernization theory; however, occupational specialization 
is the only causal mechanism (Ross, 2001). The lack of occupational specialization 
hinders the emergence of social and cultural changes such as unionization, civic group 
formation, and the development of oratory and critical thinking skills that modernization 
scholars believe must appear before democratization efforts begin. The second 
interpretation suggests that the rentier effect and modernization effect occur at the same 
time in resource-rich states (Ross, 2001). The modernization effect blocks the emergence 
of occupational specialization that bestows upon citizens the autonomous critical thinking 
skills necessary to challenge the state's elites and demand more representation (Ross, 
2001). The rentier effect further prevents the public from mobilizing politically by 
21 Ross also concluded that the resource curse was not path dependant (Ross, 2001). 
Auty also states that, "The mineral economies have underperformed compared with 
countries of a similar size and level of economic development which lack the mineral 
bonus" (Auty, 1994: 12). 
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providing social benefits without collecting taxes from the population (Lipset, 1959; 
Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 1961; Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Ross, 2001). 
My theory is that sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization via 
a two-step process. The first step occurs when sovereign wealth funds break the Dutch 
Disease cycle. Sovereign wealth funds accomplish this by promoting monetary and fiscal 
stability. Since most sovereign wealth funds started out as stabilization funds, these 
funds should remain capable of counter-acting the inflationary pressures that frequently 
plague resource-reliant states. Providing an exit to the Dutch Disease cycle allows the 
state's economy to develop a viable industrial sector over time. 
The second step emerges after the fund adds wealth accumulation as an 
investment objective. My theory is that sovereign wealth funds provide a reliable stream 
of income separate from the commodity extraction sector. Rather than concentrating 
wealth in state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds distribute excess capital to 
other sectors of the economy resulting in wide-spread industrialization. The end result is 
that states with sovereign wealth funds create occupational specialization in both the non-
resource industrial and service sectors of the economy. Workers then develop more 
specialized skills that grant them greater bargaining power against the economic elites of 
the state (Lip set, 1959; Inglehart, 1997; Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001). 
POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY 
This section introduces a rudimentary theory I am developing about sovereign 
wealth funds and political transparency. Unfortunately the time allotted for this thesis 
does not permit inclusion of a finalized version of this theory; however, I still plan to test 
the basic claim that sovereign wealth funds correlate with elevated levels of political 
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transparency ceteris paribus. My argument rests on the premise that sovereign wealth 
funds hire non-government employees and rely on international advisors for their 
investment expertise. Sovereign wealth funds are large institutional investors that require 
numerous asset managers, investment analysts, and support personnel to operate, which 
increases domestic awareness of the government's finances. Relying on external advisors 
should increases international awareness of the state's finances. 
CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
To illustrate how this theory operates in the real world, this section offers a brief 
case study of the United Arab Emirates. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the 
founder of the United Arab Emirates, started the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
(ADIA) as a stabilization fund in 1976 (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). ADIA 
was not a new endeavor, but rather an expansion and repurposing of the British colonial 
investment board that was created during the 1960s (Thornton and Reed, 2008).22 ADIA 
operated as a small stabilization and official reserve fund for the first ten years, but 
emerged as the preeminent sovereign wealth fund over the last two decades. I believe 
ADIA's status as the paramount sovereign wealth fund makes it the prime example of 
how sovereign wealth funds can increase occupational specialization and political 
transparency. 
ADIA receives most of its external capital from the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC). A continual infusion of new capital from ADNOC combined with 
above-market returns on investment means the fund currently controls an estimated $600 
22 The original fund was run by a British colonial officer who served as an advisor to the 
Abu Dhabi royal family. 
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to $875 billion in assets (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). This makes ADIA the 
second largest institutional investor in the world behind the Bank of Japan (Roy, 2006; 
Thornton and Reed, 2008).23 With such a large portfolio, ADIA certainly includes wealth 
accumulation as an investment objective. ADIA's success over this time period also 
established its status as the benchmark for newly created and existing sovereign wealth 
funds (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). 
ADIA AND POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY 
Elevated levels of political transparency are a by-product of ADIA's portfolio 
size, which increases access to the United Arab Emirates' finances through two channels. 
The first channel appears in the operational structure of the fund itself. Managing a 
portfolio worth well over half a trillion dollars requires a grandiose number of employees. 
By hiring these employees, ADIA increases the number of people with access the 
government's financial information. More access to the government's finances by 
definition results in increased political transparency. 
To understand how this works, a more detailed description of ADIA's 
management structure is necessary. ADIA functions as a single investment entity 
controlling one global fund. The government appoints a board of directors composed of 
members of the royal family (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008).24 The board is 
responsible for the overall performance of the fund but not the mundane daily operations. 
To facilitate routine management, investments are broken down into sub-funds based on 
23 The fund currently averages an annualized rate of return of 10% with new capital 
flowing in on a monthly basis (Roy, 2006). 
24 ADIA's Board of Directors is officially the supreme body with absolute control over 
ADIA's offices and business. It is comprised of a Chairman, Managing Director and 
other board members, all of whom are senior government officials appointed by Ruler's 
Decree (Roy, 2006: Thornton and Reed, 2008). 
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asset classes. Internal administrators are then appointed by the board of directors to 
oversee each of these sub-funds. To bolster investment expertise, 70% to 80% of fund's 
assets are also supervised by external managers (Roy, 2006). ADIA employs 1,100 
people internally, 70% of which are foreigners educated in Europe and North America 
(Thornton and Reed, 2008). Most of the domestic managers, analysts, and support staff 
were educated in Western colleges, with ADIA paying for their educational costs via 
scholarships (Thornton and Reed~ 2008). As more domestic employees finish their 
Western educations, ADIA hopes to reduce external manager involvement to 60% of the 
fund's assets. 
The second channel opened when ADIA adjusted investment strategies as the 
fund's capital levels surpassed the threshold required to achieve the fund's initial 
objective. ADIA shifted from an alpha-oriented to a more conservative beta-oriented 
investment strategy. According to Saeed Mubarak Al Hajeri, the executive director of 
the ADIA's emerging markets department, "We [ADIAJ are not speculators. We don't 
like to change companies or try to take out the management. We are long-term 
conservative investors" (Roy, 2006). 
In 2008, ADIA shifted its passive investment allocation from 45% of its total 
assets to 60% (Thornton and Reed, 2008). Passive investments refer to mutual and index 
funds. Most mutual and index funds are located in North America or Europe, which 
require routine security exchange filings listing major fund investors and the individual 
assets owned by the fund. Essentially, these security exchange filings unveil where and 
how ADIA invests 60% of its assets. The increased size of ADIA's portfolio and 
movement towards more conservative holdings also make it increasingly difficult for the 
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fund to keep its ownership stake in individual equities under the 4.5% threshold that 
requires ADIA to file its own security exchange reports (Roy, 2006). 
ADIA AND OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION 
Elevated levels of transparency are not the only reason I believe sovereign wealth 
funds affect regime type. I also theorize that sovereign wealth funds promote 
occupational specialization through two channels. We saw in the previous section how 
ADIA directly promoted occupational specialization by providing college scholarships to 
employees. ADIA also increases occupational specialization indirectly by investing in 
the domestic economy. To understand how this occurs, a brief explanation of the fund's 
asset allocation is necessary. ADIA invests its assets as follows: 50% to 60% in equities, 
20% to 25% in fixed income, 5% to 8% in real estate, 5% to 10% in private equity, and 
5% to 10% in alternative investments (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). Equities 
and fixed income combined account for approximately 70% to 80% of the fund's total 
assets. Most of the fund's equity and fixed income assets are invested outside of the 
Middle East (Roy, 2006). The remaining 20% to 30% of the fund's assets are invested 
domestically through real estate, private equity, and joint ventures.25 
Rather than developing an export oriented economy, the United Arab Emirates 
and ADIA focus internal investments on rebranding the state as the financial, service, and 
tourist capitol of the Arab world. ADIA and the government work together through a 
tangled web of state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships to achieve these 
goals. An entire case study would have a difficult time untangling this web, so I will 
25 ADIA invests very little in Middle Eastern stock markets and commodities themselves 
as a hedge against the state's inherent reliance on oil exports (Roy, 2006). 
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only focus on the three largest ventures. These ventures are the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Company (ADIC), Nakheel Properties, and Emaar Properties. 
The ADIC was charted by the government using capital invested by ADIA. The 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Abu Dhabi Investment Company officially exist as 
separate entities; however, ADIA owns 97.9% of ADIC (Roy, 2006). In reality, the 
ADIC essentially acts as ADIA's domestic investment branch. The company's primary 
task is promotion of the financial sector, although ADIC does own some real estate and 
invests in the Abu Dhabi Aviation Company.26 ADIC currently invests in the following 
financial corporations: National Bank of Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 
Union National Bank, Al Hilal Bank, and the Abu Dhabi National Insurance Company.27 
To promote tourism and real estate efforts in the United Arab Emirates, the 
government chartered two real estate corporations that are funded by ADIA. Nakheel 
Properties operates as state-owned enterprise while Emaar Properties functions as a 
public-private partnership.28 Nakheel Properties often does business under the name 
Dubai World.29 Emaar Properties is publicly traded on the Dubai Financial Market. 3D 
The two enterprises are officially competitors, but the companies often cooperate on 
26 Information for companies owned by ADIC is available on the company's homepage. 
Information was downloaded on Dec. 3,2010. 
http://www.zawya.comlcrnlprofile.cfrnlcid777831 
27 ADIA directly owns a 73% stake in the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (Roy, 2006). 
28 Nakheel Properties receives a substantial amount of capital from both ADIA and 
ADNOC. Of course, some of the capital invested by ADNOC might not otherwise be 
invested in Nakheel Properties if ADIA did not exist. 
29 The same Dubai World of the Dubai World's Ports Deal discussed in Chapter 1. 
30 Emaar Properties conducts business under 60 different corporate names. Emaar 
Middle East (EME) is a joint venture between Emaar Properties and Al Oula Real Estate 
Development Company. EME was created to manage several high value projects in 
Saudi Arabia. ADIA and ADIC, though, seldom do much business in other parts of the 
Middle East. 
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projects critical to the state. In these situations, Nakheel typically handles the financing 
and construction of the project while Emaar Properties functions as the project manager. 
Nakheel Properties and Emaar Properties recently completed two ambitious real 
estate deals designed by the government to bolster the state's tourist base. The first deal 
was the Dubai Palm Islands project, which consists of a series of islands jutting out into 
the Persian Gulf (Stensgaard, 2004). Together the islands form the shape of a palm tree 
surrounded by a crescent. 31 Resorts, entertainment centers, and high rise condos were 
built on each island to attract tourists and real estate mogUls. The second deal completed 
buildings for Middle Eastern branches of the Louvre and Guggenheim museums 
(Cornwell, 2006; Goldenberg, 2006, Guggenheim, '2006; Manibo, 2008). 
Large-scale construction projects, especially the massive Dubai Palm Islands deal, 
increase demand for skilled labor in the construction and dredging sectors of the 
economy. All three projects should increase occupational specialization over the long-
term by adding new forms of employment in the service sector to handle increased 
demands from tourists. Nakheel and Emaar also assist government efforts to establish the 
United Arab Emirates as the regional service capitol of the Middle East. These 
construction projects include a New York University campus and a regional outpost for 
the Cleveland Clinic, and the recently completed Burj Khalifa (Stack, 2005; Lewis 2009). 
The New York University campus should increase the number of the state's citizens that 
receive a top-notch education. The Cleveland Clinic will elevate demand for highly 
specialized medical personnel within the state. Many future projects, including the 
31 The Dubai Palm Islands was divided into three separate projects: Palm Jumeirah, Palm 
Jebel Ali, and Palm Deira. These names are often used interchangeably in news reports 
and mass media. 
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Nakheel Tower, have been put on hold till global financial prospects recover. I do not 
expect ADIC's influence on the United Arab Emirates' domestic economy to diminish 
anytime soon. 
OVERVIEW 
The concept of state-funded investment funds started in the 1950s. Traditionally 
these funds were referred to as sovereign wealth management funds and divided into four 
categories based on the fund's investment objective: official reserve funds, stabilization 
funds, public pension funds, and state-owned enterprises. From the 1990s on, capital 
levels increased in stabilization and public pension funds well beyond the level necessary 
to achieve the fund's initial investment objective. The opportunity cost of idle capital 
was too high for the state to ignore, so fund managers were tasked with wealth 
accumulation as the fund's new primary investment objective. To accomplish this goal, 
managers began to invest excess capital in riskier, growth-oriented financial products. 
The term sovereign wealth fund was created to accurately reflect the shift in investment 
objectives experienced by established wealth funds over the past two decades. 
The second half of the chapter introduced my theory that sovereign wealth funds 
assuage the political effects of the resource curse by promoting occupational 
specialization and political transparency. The sovereign wealth fund exit to the resource 
curse works by breaking the Dutch Disease cycle of deindustrialization and introducing a 
resource-independent stream of government spending that invests in diverse economic 
enterprises. Sovereign wealth funds accomplish these feats through the promotion of 
fiscal stability and the creation of non-resource state-owned enterprises. The chapter 
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concluded with a brief case study that illustrates how my theory works in the real world 
with regards to the United Arab Emirates' Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of data collection efforts for 
the time-series cross-sectional database I developed for this study. The chapter starts by 
formally introducing my hypotheses then defines the dependent and independent 
variables. Independent variables are broken down into three main sections: base model 
variables, the explanatory variable, and test variables. The base model section is broken 
down into two sub-sections: resource curse variables and control variables. The test 
variables section is divided into two sub-sections. The first section introduces the 
occupational specialization variables used to test hypotheses one and two. The second 
section covers the test and unique control variables used to evaluate hypothesis three. 
The chapter also introduces the multivariate auto-regressive integrated moving-
average (ARIMA) model I use in Chapter 5 to test the sovereign wealth fund effect on 
regime type. The regime-estimation model is: 
Regimej,t = al + b1(Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_s) + b3(Loglncomej,t_s) + b4(Islamj) + 
bs(Regimej,t_s) + b6(SWF), 
where i is the state and t is the year.32 The dependent variable Regime measures the 
authoritarian and democratic characteristics of each government. The variables Oil and 
32 I borrowed the basic elements of Michal Ross's regime estimation model to for my 
statistical analysis; thus, my data collection techniques and variable names for control 
variables will mimic those found in Ross's paper. 
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Minerals respectively measure oil and mineral exports as a percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) for each year from 1970 to 2008. Log Income measures the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita for each year included in the study. Islam measures the 
percent of each state's population that professed Islam as their faith in the year 2000. 
Regime run on a five year lag is included in the model as an independent variable to 
control for each state's unique historical trajectory. Finally, the variable SWF is a 
dummy variable coded 1 for each year that a state had a sovereign wealth fund and 0 
otherwise. 
The data for this analysis was collected from the following sources: Freedom 
House Inc. (FH); International Labour Organization (ILO); Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 (Polity IV); Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute (SWF Institute); Transparency International (TI); United Nations Educational, 
Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); World Bank, and the World Christian 
Encyclopedia. Data was gathered for as many of the 192 member states of the United 
Nations possible for the years 1970 to 2008.33 
HYPOTHESES 
To answer the first question, I broke the central claim that sovereign wealth funds 
promote occupational specialization into two testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
(HI) is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds create more occupational 
specialization than resource-reliant states without those funds. The second hypothesis 
33 By most accounts, there are 195 states in the world that meet the minimum criterion for 
independence. The three states that meet the criterion for independence but are not UN 
member states are Kosovo, Taiwan, and the Vatican City. 
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(H2) is: Greater levels of occupational specialization associated with sovereign wealth 
funds result in less authoritarian regimes. That is, resource-reliant states with sovereign 
wealth funds are less authoritarian than counterpart states, because the funds' promote 
occupational specialization. I distilled the second research question into a third 
hypothesis to test the transparency claim. The third hypothesis (H3) is: Sovereign wealth 
fund states have lower corruption index scores compared to counterpart states. 
To test the first hypothesis, I separate resource-reliant states into two groups 
based on whether the state had a sovereign wealth fund or not and ran a difference in 
means test. This difference in means test will tell us if sovereign wealth funds promote 
occupational specialization. I test the second hypothesis using the regime-estimation 
ARIMA model introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Examining parameter 
variability within the model will tell us if the occupational specialization created by 
sovereign wealth funds produces less authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). 
I performed another separation of means test to determine if resource-reliant 
states with sovereign wealth funds are more transparent than resource-reliant states 
without these funds. Resource-reliant states are divided into two groups based on the 
presence of sovereign wealth funds using the same methodology as the occupational 
specialization difference in means test.34 Finally, I introduce a transparency variable into 
the ARIMA regime-estimation model to see if the difference in corruption levels 
associated with sovereign wealth funds produces less authoritarian regimes. 
34 In Chapter 5, I define resource-reliant states as any country where oil or mineral 
exports exceed 5% of GDP over the time period that particular test covers. Both 
difference in means tests and the political transparency ARIMA cover the time period 
1992 to 2008. The ARIMA model for occupational specialization covers 1970 to 2008. 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable Regime measures the presence of democratic and 
authoritarian characteristics present in each state's government. Gurr, Jaggers, and 
Marshall's Polity IV regime scores were used for this variable. The Polity I Project was 
originally started by Ted Gurr with the intent of creating a database of authoritarian 
regime characteristics that could be used in comparative quantitative analysis. The Polity 
IV dataset is the most appropriate measure of regime type for my thesis because it does 
not treat the concepts of democracy and autocracy as mutually exclusive forms of 
government (Ross, 2001). Scores cover a 21 point range that offers a wider spectrum of 
governance forms than other measures of regime type. This is important, because the 
sovereign wealth fund effect may not be large enough to be fully captured by more 
discrete measures of regime types. 
The Polity IV Project run by Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers updated the 
Polity III scores by coding six different political characteristics indicative of authoritarian 
or democratic rule (Gurr et aI, 2010). These six components further break down the four 
principles present in government institutions that indicate regime type: qualities of 
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, political competition, and 
changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority (Gurr et aI, 2010). 
A total of ten characteristics are coded: six for the components and four for the 
principles. The Polity IV researchers evaluate each government using the ten 
characteristics. If the government exhibits a democratic trait for that characteristic, that 
aspect is coded + 1. If the government exhibits an authoritarian trait for that 
characteristic, that aspect is coded -1 (Gurr et aI, 2010). The final regime score is 
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calculated by adding the authoritarian and democratic scores together. The dataset for the 
Polity IV Project covers every major, independent state in the world system with a 
population of 500,000 or more. A total of 163 states are included in the Polity IV Project. 
Polity scores range from -10 to + 1 O. A score of -lOis assigned to a government 
classified as a fully institutionalized autocracy such as a hereditary monarchy. A score of 
+ 10 is assigned to states with fully consolidated democratic governments. Generally, 
states with scores between -10 and -6 are called autocracies; scores from -5 to +5 are 
called anocracies; and scores from +6 to + 10 are considered democracies. Incoherent 
forms of government are assigned the special values of -66 and -99 (Marshall, Gurr, and 
Harff, 1999). To make interpretation easier for this thesis, I followed Ross's lead and 
rescaled the -10 to + 1 0 scores into a new scale ranging from 0 to 21 with a 0 
corresponding to an original score of -10 and 21 corresponding to a + 1 0 (Ross, 2001). 
Data is not available for states with populations less than 500,000?5 I borrowed 
Ross's concept for countries excluded by the Polity IV Project. This methodology 
creates a Polity IV score by adding the state's Freedom House scores for political rights 
and civil liberties and rescaling the result onto a 21 point scale (Ross, 2001). After 
transforming Freedom House Scores, regime data was available for all 190 states.36 
Incoherent forms of government coded as -66 or -99 are excluded. 
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.1 on the next page. There are 
2,233 instances of autocratic governments in a given year over the 1970 to 2008 time 
period covered in this study. Autocratic governments account for 33.8% of the total 
35 Polity IV scores are available for every major oil exporting state except Brunei 
Darussalam. 
36 The two states missing data were Nauru and Tuvalu. 
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available data. There are 1,442 instances of anocratic rule accounting for 21.80% of the 
valid cases; and 2,940 instances of democratic rule accounting for 44.4% of valid cases. 
Of the total data available, there were 268 cases of incoherent governments accounting 
for 3.9%. 
Table 4.1 Regime Type 
Freguencies Percent Valid Percent 
Autocracy 2233 32.4 33.8 
Anocracy 1442 21.0 21.8 
Democracy 2940 42.7 44.4 
Incoherent 268 3.9 
Total 6883 100.0 100.0 
Source: Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV and Freedom House Index 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: BASE MODEL 
The base model includes five control variables. The base model is: 
Regimej,t = a] + b](Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_s) + b3(LogIncomej,t_s) + b4(Islamj) + 
bs(Regimej,t_s). 
The variables Oil and Minerals are included to measure the resource curse effect 
associated with oil and mineral exports. I explore these variables in the section resource 
curse variables, Two variables are included to control for factors that modernization 
scholars determined are vital determinants of democratization. These variables are Islam 
and Log Income. I also included the variable Lag Regime in the base model. The 
purpose of this variable is to control for each state's unique political history. The 
variables Islam, Log Income, and Lag Regime are covered in the control variables section. 
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RESOURCE CURSE VARIABLES 
The variables Oil and Minerals are included to measure each state's economic 
reliance on oil and mineral exports.37 Data for these variables were downloaded from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators database. The database reports oil and 
mineral exports as a percent of merchandise exports. These numbers were multiplied by 
the total currency value of merchandise exports for the appropriate year to find the actual 
value of oil and mineral exports for each case?8 That number was then divided by the 
state's total GDP to calculate the percent of each state's GDP accounted for by oil and 
mineral exports. Data for fuel and mineral exports are available from 1962 to 2008. 
Oil export values include all mineral-based fuels as defined by the United Nations 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 3, sections 32 to 35. This 
includes: coal, coke, and briquettes (32), petroleum and petroleum related products and 
materials (33), natural and manufactured gas (34), and electric current (35). Mineral 
export values include all ores and metals defined by the SITC revision 3, sections 27, 28, 
and 68 under nonfuel minerals. This classification includes: crude fertilizer and 
associated minerals (27), metalliferous ores and scrap (28), and non-ferrous metals (68). 
Oil-reliant states are classified as any country where oil exports accounted for an average 
of 5% of GDP between 1970 and 2008. 
Following the methodology of Ross as well as Sachs and Warner, oil and mineral 
export values for Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago were adjusted to reflect net exports 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Ross, 2001). This is necessary 
37 The variables Oil and Minerals are similar to the variables used by Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) and Ross (2001). 
38 Each case represents one year for each state. All economic data is measured in current 
U.S. dollars. 
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because Singapore and Trinidad are major transshipment points for oil and minerals 
extracted by states within the region (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1999; 
Ross,2001). Reporting the World Bank numbers would artificially inflate the variables 
Oil and Minerals for these two states. Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago were adjusted 
to 0.01 %. Mineral-reliant states are classified as any country where mineral exports 
accounted for an average of 5% of GDP between 1970 and 2008. 
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.2 for variable Oil. An adequate 
number of data points were available for SPSS to create a moving average of the Oil 
variable for 175 of the 190 states for which data was collected. Missing states account 
for 7.9% of the 190 states included in the study. For the variable Oil: 32 states for which 
data was available were oil-reliant accounting for 16.75% of the original 190 state 
population and 18.29% of the 175 state-sample. There where 143 states not reliant on oil 
exports accounting for 75.16% of the original 190 state population and 81.71 % of the 175 
state-sample. 
Oil-Reliant States 
Non Oil-Reliant States 
Missing 
Total 
















The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.3 for the variable Minerals. An 
adequate number of data points were available for SPSS to create a moving average for 
the Minerals variable for 175 of the 190 states for which data was collected. Missing 
states account for 7.9% of the 190 states included in the study. For the variable Minerals: 
18 states for which data was available were mineral-reliant accounting for 9.47% of the . 
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original 190 state population and 10.29% of the 175 state-sample. There where 157 
states not reliant on mineral exports accounting for 82.63% of the original 190 state 
population and 89.71 % of the 175 state-sample. 
Mineral-Reliant States 
Non Mineral-Reliant States 
Missing 
Total 
















I ran a bivariate regression between the variable Regime and Oil. The dependent 
variable was the moving average of Regime from 1970 to 2008. The independent 
variable was the moving average of Oil for the same time period. To control for 
autocorrelation and ensure causality, the variable Oil was run on a five year lag. The 
bivariate coefficient between Regime and Oil was -0.277?9 This relationship is 
significant at the 99% level with a p-value of 0.000. 
Using the same methodology for variable Minerals that I used for the variable Oil, 
the coefficient of the bivariate regression between the variables Regime and Minerals is -
0.021. Interestingly, this relationship is not statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.875. I reran the test using data from 1970 to 2000 and found that the relationship for 
that time period was significant at the 95% level with a p-value of 0.024. Either the 
states that emerged during the third wave of democratization, the commodity boom of the 
past decade, or some combination of the two mitigated the mineral resource curse. 
39 This methodology and the time periods covered are consistent with the multivariate 
ARIMA model used in Chapter 5. 
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CONTROL VARIABLES 
Islam is an important control variable because previous studies suggest that a 
statistically significant negative correlation exists between states with a high population 
percentage of Muslims and democratic rule (Bollen, 1983; Lipset, 1994; Saleme', 1994; 
Waterbury, 1994; Barro, 1997; Midlarsky, 1998; Barro, 1999; Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001). 
There also exists a strong correlation between the presence of Islam and oil reserves. The 
exact coefficient size, theoretical explanations, and whether or not this relationship will 
continue into the future are open for debate.4o Without taking sides on this issue, I make 
the assumption that Islam is currently strongly correlated with authoritarian rule and will 
control for it appropriately. 
The variable Islam measures the percent of a state's population who professed 
Islam as their religious faith in 2000. The data comes from the second edition of the 
World Christian Encyclopedia while missing values were collected from the u.s. 
Religious Freedom Report 2002, U.S. Religious Freedom Report 2006, the International 
Religious Freedom Report 2009, and the UN Vital Statistics Report. Information was 
obtained for all 190 states with known regime type. The Pearson correlation between the 
variables Islam and Regime type in 2000 was -0.564 and was significant at the 99% 
confidence level. The p-value reported by SPSS was 0.000. The Pearson correlation 
40 Barro reported a correlation of (-0.38) between democracy and Islamic populations 
(Barro, 1997: 13). Ross also found a correlation of (-0.44) between Islam and Oil. 
Concerning the future of Islam and democratic rule, two predominantly Muslim states 
have recently made sharp moves from authoritarian rule. Nigeria's Polity IV score 
jumped from a -6 to +4 in 2000 and remained there shifting Nigeria from an autocracy to 
an anocracy. Following the 1965 military coup and General Suharto's ascendance to the 
presidency, Indonesia's score moved to -7 in 1970 and remained there until the late 
1990s. In 2009, Indonesia's Polity IV score had risen to a +8. That moves Indonesia 
from a solid autocratic to a solid democratic score in a decade. 
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between Oil for the year 2008 and Islam is 0.30 and is significant at the 98% level with a 
p-value of 0.005. 
A breakdown of the descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.4. The Muslim 
population comprised less than 20% of the population in 134 states accounting for 70.5% 
of the total 190 states included in the study. The Muslim population constituted 20% to 
80% of the total population in 32 states accounting for 10.6% of the states. I ran a 
bivariate regression model with the moving average of Regime for the years 1970 to 2008 
as the dependent variable and Islam as the independent variable. The coefficient between 
Regime and Islam is -9.212. The relationship is significant at the 99% level with a p-




























Source: World Christian Encyclopedia; U.S. Religious Freedom Report 2002; U.S. 
Religious Freedom Report 2006; International Religious Freedom Report 2009; and the 
UN Vital Statistics Report 
Income levels are an important prerequisite for democratization in modernization 
theory (Lipset, 1959; Deutsch, 1961; Inglehart, 1997). The resource curse literature 
emerged in part because resource-rich states did not democratize despite increasing 
income levels. To ensure that income levels are high enough to promote democratization 
in resource-rich states and that the tested effects are actually the true explanatory effects, 
I include the Log Income variable in the base model. The Log Income variable measures 
the natural log of real per capita GDP in current U.S. dollars. 
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Data was downloaded from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
database. Source data for the World Indicators dataset comes from the OEeD National 
Accounts data files and the World Bank's own national accounts data. The World Bank 
calculates real GDP by adding the gross value added by all of a state's citizens to product 
taxes and subtracting any subsidies not included in the value of the productS.41 GDP per 
capita is then calculated by dividing GDP by the state's midyear population. The data 
used was reported in current U.S. dollar. Since per capita GDP can only be a positive 
number, the log of per capita GDP is used instead. Using the natural log also makes 
interpretation easier. 
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.5. There are 175 cases of states 
with log income levels between 0 and 1.9. These low income states account for 3.6% of 
the total cases. 68.3% of the states have log income levels between 2.0 and 2.9. And 
28.1 % of these states have log income levels between 3.0 and 4.0. The bivariate 
coefficient between the moving average of Regime from 1970 to 2008 and the moving 
average of Log Income run on a five year lag is 2.939. The relationship is significant at 

























41 The World Bank does not include deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
the depletion of natural resources in its calculations for Real GDP. 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXPLANATORY VARIABLE 
The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund is a dummy variable that measures the 
presence of a wealth fund for each country. The variable is coded 1 for each year that a 
state possesses a sovereign wealth fund and 0 for any year it does not. The time series 
covers the time period from 1970 to 2010. The data for these variables was compiled 
from data available on the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute's homepage. See Appendix 
B for the data used to create this variable. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 
4.6. Data was available for all 190 states included in the study. There are 6,728 cases of 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund variable that SPSS can utilize to create a moving average 
variable. Of these cases, 420 were coded 1 for the presence of a sovereign wealth fund 
and 6,308 were coded 0 to indicate the absence of a sovereign wealth fund in a state for a 
speCific year. 
The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund does not distinguish between capitalization 
sources in the statistical analysis; however, I do break down the states here by funding 
source for the reader. States with sovereign wealth funds capitalized by oil exports are: 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, East Timor, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. States with funds capitalized by minerals are: 
Botswana (diamonds and minerals), Chile (copper), and Kiribati (phosphates). States 
with funds capitalized by non-commodity sources are: Australia, Brazil, China, France, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Vietnam. 
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Running a bivariate regression with Regime as the dependent variable and the 
moving average of Sovereign Wealth Fund as the independent variable produced a 
coefficient of -3.952 that is significant at the 98% level with a p-value of 0.007. 
Consistent with the methodology of this paper, the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund was 
run on a 5 year lag. Since the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund is a dummy variable, the 
coefficient is the actual difference in the regime score for states with and without 
sovereign wealth funds. Therefore, sovereign wealth funds are associated with a decrease 
of 3.952 points on the 21 point Polity IV scale.42 
Table 4.6 Sovereign Wealth Funds 
States with SWF 















INDEPENDENT TEST VARIABLES: HYPOTHESES ONE AND TWO 
Occupational specialization is a key link between economic growth and 
democracy according to modernization theory (Lipset, 1958; Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 
1961). Ross also found that occupational specialization appeared to be the only causal 
mechanism between modernization theory and the resource curse (Ross, 2001).43 The 
first two hypotheses test the claim that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds 
generate more occupational specialization by reinvesting excess capital than counterpart 
42 The bivariate regression analysis does not control for resource exports. I expect the 
relationship between sovereign wealth funds to shift positive after controlling for the 
resource curse effects. 
43 The Dutch Disease section of Chapter 2 offers a more detailed explanation of how 
occupational specialization affects democratization. 
59 
states that do not have sovereign wealth funds. The first hypothesis (HI) is: Resource-
reliant states with sovereign wealth funds create more occupational specialization than 
resource-reliant states without those funds. The second hypothesis (H2) is: Greater 
levels of occupational specialization result in less authoritarian regimes in resource-
reliant states with sovereign wealth funds compared to counterpart without sovereign 
wealth funds. To test the occupational specialization claim, I added four new variables to 
the multivariate model: Men in Industry, Women in Industry, Men in Services, and 
Women in Services. The model for hypotheses one and two is: 
Regimej,t = al + bl (Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_5) + b3(Loglncomej,t_5) + b4(Islamj) + 
b5(Regimej.t-5) + b6(SWFi,t-5) + b7(Government Activityi,t-s) + b8(Men in Industryi,t-s) + 
b9(Women in IndustrYj,t_5) + bJO(Men in Servicesi,t_s) + bll(Women in Servicesj,t_s). 
The variables Men in Industry and Women in Industry measure the percent of the working 
population that are employed in industrial activities, while the variables Men in Services 
and Women in Services measures the percent of the working population that are 
employed in the service sector. 
The data for the occupational specialization variables was downloaded from the 
ILO's online Laborsta database page. The information can be found in Table IC: 
Economically Active Population, by occupation and status in employment. The ILO 
collected data for this table from UNESCO educational surveys and government census 
forms. 44 Missing values were inputted from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators database. In the ILO dataset, information is reported in three classification 
categories: International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 4, International 
44 This data can be found in print in the ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
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Classification of Status in Employment (lSCE) 1958, and International Classification of 
Status in Employment (ISCE) 1993. 
The World Bank data was reported in two classification categories: ISIC revision 
2 and ISIC revision 3. Industrial sectors are defined in ISIC revision 4 in tabulation 
categories B-F and include: mining and quarrying (B); manufacturing (C); electricity, 
gas, steam, and air conditioning supply (D); water supply including sewerage, waste 
management, and remediation activities (E); and construction (F). Full classifications 
and subcategories for all five classifications can be found in Appendix C. The variables 
Men in Industry and Women in Industry were created by adding these categories together 
which yields the percent of the working population employed in industrial activity. 
Descriptive statistics for industrial participation variables can be found in Table 
4.7 and Table 4.8. Data was available for 33.1 % of the total cases for the variable Men in 
Industry and 32.5% of the total cases for the variable Women in Industry. Enough data 
was available for SPSS to create moving averages of both variables for 172 of the 190 
states included in the time-series cross-sectional dataset. That accounts for 90.53% of the 
total 190 state population. 
Men in Industry 
Data Missing 
Total 









Source: Laborsta Dataset, !LO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank 
Women in Industry 
Data Missing 
Total 









Source: Laborsta Dataset, ILO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank 
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The bivariate coefficient between the moving average of Regime and the moving 
average of Men in Industry run on a five year lag is 0.194. The bivariate coefficient 
between the moving average of Regime and the moving average of Women in Industry 
run on a five year lag is 0.097. The relationship between Regime and Men in Industry is 
significant at the 99% level; however, the relationship between Regime and Women in 
Industry is not statistically significant. The p-value for Men in Industry was 0.000, while 
the p-value for Women in Industry was 0.132. 
Service sector activity is defined in ISle revision 4 in tabulation categories G-P 
and include: wholesale and retail trade including repair of motor vehicles (G); 
transportation and storage (H); accommodation and food service activities (I); 
information and communication (J); financial and insurance activities (K); real estate 
activities (L); professional, scientific, and technical activities (M); administrative and 
support service activities (N); public administration and defense including compulsory 
social security (0); education (P); human health and social work activities (Q); arts, 
entertainment, and recreation (R); other service activities (S); and household activities 
including the production of undifferentiated goods and services (T). Full classifications 
and subcategories for all five classifications can be found in Appendix D. The variables 
Men in Services and Women in Services were created by adding these categories together 
which yields the percent of the working population employed in service activity. 
Descriptive statistics for the service sector participation variables can be found in 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 on the next page. The coefficient between the moving average 
of Regime and Men in Services from 1970 to 2008 is 0.046. The coefficient between the 
moving average of Regime and Women in Services from 1970 to 2008 is 0.080. The 
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relationship between Regime and Men in Services is not significant; however, the 
relationship between Regime and Women in Services is significant at the 99% level. In 
other words, occupational specialization does affect regime type, but only for men in 
industry and women in services. The p-value for Men in Services was 0.265, while the p-
value for Women in Services was 0.001. 
Table 4.9 Men in Services 











Source: Laborsta Dataset, ILO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank 
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Source: Laborsta Dataset, ILO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank 
INDEPENDENT TEST VARIABLES: HYPOTHESIS THREE 
I distilled the transparency claim into a the third hypothesis (H3): Resource-
reliant states with sovereign wealth funds have lower corruption index scores compared 
to resource-reliant states without sovereign wealth funds. My claim is that despite 
opaque structures, sovereign wealth funds still increase government transparency since 
fund managers must comply with local security laws present in the states where they 
invest money; and sovereign wealth funds unveil government's finances to the citizens 
employed by the fund. As assets have increased, sovereign wealth fund managers have 
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gained a significant amount of economic power within the government that created the 
fund (Rozanov, 2005). That power might also elevate transparency levels. 
More capital available for investment motivated many governments to seek 
external advice regarding the strategy and management of its sovereign wealth fund. The 
massive $700 billion AIDA fund created by the United Arab Emirates leads the way in 
this regard. In 2008, AIDA executives met with a who's who of Wall Street including: 
veteran investor Wilbur Ross, Blackrock Financial CEO Larry Fink, Goldman Sachs 
CEO Lloyd Blankfein, and Warren Buffet from Berskhire Hathaway. Also, 70% of the 
fund's 1,100 professional employees are foreigners mainly educated in the United States 
and Europe (Thornton and Reed, 2008). 
To test hypothesis three, I created the variable Political Transparency, which 
measures the level of perceived corruption present in the government of each state for 
each year from 1995 to 2008. The variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct 
Investment are included to control for any correlation between stable governments and 
sovereign wealth funds that might exist. The model for the second claim is: 
Regimej,t = al + bl (Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_s) + b3(LogIncomej,t_s) + b4(Islamj) + 
bs(Regimej,t-s) + b6(SWFi,t-s) + b7(Political TransparencYj,t_s) + 
B8(Political Stabilityi.t_s) + b9(Foreign Direct Investmenti.t_s). 
The test variable for this claim is Political Transparency. The variable was 
created by downloading each state's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from the 
Transparency International online database. According to Transparency International, 
the CPI is a "survey of surveys," combining data from thirteen different global surveys 
that measure the perceived level of corruption in each state. A higher score on the index 
means that state is more transparent, while a lower score translates to a less transparent 
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state. Data is available for 177 of the 192 United Nations member states from 1998 to 
2010. 
Data was missing for: Andorra, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, North Korea, Palua, San 
Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Suriname. The lowest score possible is a 1 and the 
highest score possible is a 10. Transparency International collected data from ten 
independent institutions for the 2009 index including: Columbia University, Economists 
Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Information International, International Institute for 
Management Development, Merchant International Group, Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, World Economic Forum, 
and World Markets Research Centre. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.11. 
78.08% of the 177 states that data was available for had a CPI score below 5, indicating 
that these states are not transparent. Only 21.92% of the 177 states were classified as 
transparent. 
Table 4.11 Political Transparency 
Freguencies Percent Valid Percent 
1-1.9 109 4.44 6.51 
2-2.9 511 20.81 30.53 
3-3.9 367 14.94 21.92 
4-4.9 190 7.74 11.35 
5-5.9 130 5.29 7.77 
6-6.9 101 4.11 6.03 
7-7.9 89 3.62 5.32 
8-8.9 87 3.54 5.20 
9-10 90 3.66 5.38 
Missing 782 31.84 
Total 2456 100.0 100.0 
Source: Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International 
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I ran a bivariate regression analysis to determine the correlation between the 
presence of sovereign wealth funds and political transparency. The dependent variable 
was the mean of the variables Political Transparency from the years 1995 to 2008. The 
independent variable was the mean of the variables Sovereign Wealth Fund for the same 
time period. The variable Mean Sovereign Wealth Fund had a coefficient of 1.589 and is 
significant at the 98% confidence level. The p-value was 0.007. 
While researching emerging market BRIC states for Goldman Sachs, Jim O'Neill 
and his fellow economists discovered a large and highly significant correlation between 
greater levels of political stability and increased levels of foreign direct investment 
(O'Neill, 2007).45 If sovereign wealth funds are related to higher levels of political 
stability, then increased foreign direct investment might account for greater occupational 
specialization in sovereign wealth fund states. I created the variables Foreign Direct 
Investment and Political Stability to control for the possibility that political transparency 
is correlated with both political stability and foreign direct investment. 
The variable Political Stability measures the year over year change in each state's 
Polity IV score for every year in the analysis. This variable was created by subtracting 
the previous year's Polity IV score from the current year's Polity IV score. If no change 
was measured, a 0 was coded for that year. This method produces both positive and 
negative values. A positive value indicates a political movement towards 
democratization, whereas a negative value indicates a political movement towards more 
authoritarianism. Since we are only interested in the magnitude of political change and 
45 The citation came form The BRICs and Beyond, a book published by Goldman Sachs 
in 2007. The claim originated in a Goldman Sachs working paper titled "The World 
Needs Better Economic BRICs" published in 1999. The term BRIC stands for the large 
emerging market states of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
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not the direction of that change, the absolute value of these scores was taken. The result 
is a positive number showing the size of the political movement, but not the direction of 
that movement. 
Descriptive statistics for the variable Political Stability can be found in Table 
4.12. After controlling for incoherent forms of government, data was available for 95% 
of the 6,728 total cases. There were 5,675 cases for where no regime change occurred. 
This accounts for 88.8% of the available data. Polity IV defines a "minor regime 
change" as a shift of 1 to 6 points. There were 578 minor regimes changes accounting for 
9.0% of the valid cases. Polity IV defines a "major regime change" as a shift of 7 to 20 
























Source: Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 
I ran a bivariate regression analysis to determine the coefficient between the 
presence of sovereign wealth funds and political stability. The dependent variable was 
the mean of the variable Political Stability from the years 1970 to 2008. The independent 
variable was the mean of the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund from 1970 to 2008. The 
variable Mean Sovereign Wealth Fund had a coefficient of -0.330. The relationship was 
not statistically significant, because the p-value was only 0.126. 
The variable Foreign Direct Investment was downloaded from the World Bank's 
World Economic Indicators database. The variable isjoreign direct investment (net 
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inflow, % GDP).46 The World Bank defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as the net 
inflow of investment capital used to attain a management interest in enterprises that 
operate in a state other than the investor's own state.47 The World Bank uses the balance 
of payments method to measure the net inflow of FDI in current U.S. dollars measured as 
a percent of GDP.48 Net inflows are calculated by subtracting new investment inflows 
minus disinvestment outflows. This method allows scholars to determine if a state is a 
net creditor or a net debtor.49 Data was collected from reports filed by foreign investors. 
Descriptive statistics for the variable Foreign Direct Investment can be found in Table 
4.13. Data was available for 5,046 of the 6,728 total cases. This accounts for 75.0% of 
the total available cases. SPSS was able to create the moving average of this variable for 
all 190 states. 
Table 4.13 Foreign Direct Investment 












46 Foreign Direct Investment Data for the Federated States of Micronesia, Iraq, Marshall 
Islands, Palau, Qatar, Timor Leste, and the United Arab Emirates was downloaded from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD). 
47 Management interest is defined as 10% or more of the voting stock in the enterprise 
being purchased. FDI is calculated by adding equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
and other assorted long-term and short-term capital included in the balance of payments. 
48 The balance of payments method reflects account transactions only. 
49 Under this measurement methodology, States with a negative FDI are net debtors, 
while states with a positive FDI are net creditors. 
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OVERVIEW 
Chapter four introduced the three hypotheses and two ARIMA regime-estimation 
models that will be used to test my claim that states with sovereign wealth funds have 
higher levels of occupational specialization and political transparency that produce less 
authoritarian regimes than counterpart states that lack these funds. The first hypothesis 
(HI) is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds create more occupational 
specialization than resource-reliant states without those funds. The second hypothesis 
(H2) is: Greater levels of occupational specialization result in less authoritarian regimes 
in resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds versus counterpart states. The 
third hypothesis (H3) is: Sovereign wealth fund states have lower corruption index scores 
compared to counterpart states. 
The base model includes the control variables Oil and Minerals that measure the 
presence of the resource curse in each state. Islam and Log Income are included to 
control for known authoritarian and democratic effects that Islam and income exert on 
governments. The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund was added to control for the presence 
of sovereign wealth funds in each state. The four variables for occupational 
specialization and the variable Political Transparency were added to test my claims that 
the presence of sovereign wealth funds lead to less authoritarian regimes. And finally, 
the variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct Investment were added to ensure that 





The purpose of this chapter is to present the inferential statistics, difference in 
means tests, and auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model I use to test 
the claim that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds are less authoritarian 
than counterpart states that do not utilize sovereign wealth funds. My theory is based on 
two central claims. The first claim is that states with sovereign wealth funds invest more 
capital in its own economy over time. That is, sovereign wealth funds offer a second 
source of capital separate from oil and mineral tariffs that states use to advance its 
domestic economy leading to greater levels of occupational specialization. The second 
claim is that increased levels of occupational specialization associated with sovereign 
wealth funds states equate to less-authoritarian rule. And the third claim is that despite 
the opaque nature of sovereign wealth funds, states that operate these funds are forced to 
conduct government activities more transparently than resource-reliant states that do not 
have sovereign wealth funds. 
METHODOLOGY 
I use a pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset composed of repeated 
observations on states over a thirty-eight year period from 1970 to 2008 to construct the 
multivariate model used to test my hypotheses that sovereign wealth funds mitigate the 
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antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. The major advantage of using a time-series 
cross-national dataset lies in the dramatic increase in the size ofN (sample size) and T 
(time points) (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck and Katz, 1996; Beck et. aI, 1993; and Sayers, 
1989). The disadvantages of using time-series cross-sectional are the methodological 
challenges associated with the various types of regression analysis. 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is problematic due to the 
unique temporal and spatial properties inherent to time-series cross-national datasets that 
lead to time-correlated errors and heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). To 
overcome this problem, Richard Parks suggested using the optimal characteristics of 
generalized least squares (GLS) regression analysis; however, this method has its own 
problems for time-series cross-sectional datasets (Parks, 1967). The problem with Park's 
GLS method of regression analysis is the model's reliance on information about the error 
process that we do not have in real life. Thus, GLS regression analysis will tend to 
severely underestimate parameter variability by anywhere from 50% to 300% (Beck and 
Katz, 1995). 
Since I do not have the error process information available for the ARIMA model 
that allows the use of GLS, it appears that the only other option is the vastly more 
complicated feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression analysis. According to 
Nathaniel Beck and Jonathon Katz, FGLS is: " ... 'feasible' because it uses an estimate of 
the error process, avoiding the GLS assumption that the error process is known" (Beck 
and Katz, 1995: 634). However, Beck and Katz have provided a pathway to return to 
OLS regression analysis. First, the temporal issues associated with pooled time-series 
cross-sectional data can be handled by lagging the dependent variable. This method 
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eliminates serial correlation of the errors allowing the use of OLS regression analysis to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Standard errors should be calculated using panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE). The OLS residuals can then be checked to ensure that 
the model is free of the more severe cases of heteroskedasticity or contemporaneous 
correlation of the errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
In order to analyze how sovereign wealth funds affect occupational specialization 
and political transparency, I created two auto-regressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) models. The first two model measures how sovereign wealth funds and 
occupational specialization affect regime type, while the third and fourth models test the 
transparency claim. Model I (MI) includes the five control variables from the base 
model along with the four variables that measure occupational specialization: Men in 
Industry, Women in Industry, Men in Services, Women in Services. This model tests the 
claim that sovereign wealth funds increase occupational specialization, which then 
cultivates less authoritarian regimes. Model 2 (M2) tests the political transparency claim. 
Model 2 includes the five control variables from the base model as well as the control 
variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct Investment. This model tests the claim 
that sovereign wealth funds increase political transparency, thus mitigating the 
antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. The test variable for Model 2 is Political 
Transparency. 
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION 
My first hypothesis (Hd is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds 
create more occupational specialization than resource-reliant states without those funds. 
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To test this claim, I ran an independent samples t-test for the level of occupational 
specialization between resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds and resource-
reliant states without sovereign wealth funds. I defined resource-reliant states for this test 
as any state that where oil or mineral exports account for an average of 5% of GDP for 
the time period 1992 to 2008. Of the 190 states with known regime type, 15 states do not 
have any information about oil or mineral exports from the time period 1992 to 2008. 
That leaves 175 states with at least one year of oil or mineral export data available. 
Since this study is focused on democratization, I deleted any state that had already 
democratized by 1992. Any state that was democratic in 1992, but autocratic or 
authoritarian in 2008 was left in the study. 50 This method produced a total of 31 oil-
reliant states and 14 mineral-reliant states. There were five states that were both oil-
reliant and mineral-reliant during that period, which yields a total of 40 resource-reliant 
states from 1992 to 2008.51 See Appendix E and Appendix F for a full list of the 40 
resource-reliant states. 
Running a difference in means test for the occupational specialization variables is 
difficult, because occupational specialization data is not available for every state. Even 
when data is available for a state, the date might not be available for every year. Given 
the limited access to data for occupational specialization, I created new variables for all 
four measures of occupational specialization by finding the means of each state for every 
year available from 1992 to 2008.52 The problem is further compounded by the fact that 
50 This methodology is consistent throughout Chapter 5. 
51 Iraq is excluded for the time period 1992 to 2008, because the regime data indicates an 
incoherent government for much of this time period. 
52 I separate the occupational specialization variables throughout this study to control for 
the disparate effects of male and female labor in Muslim states. 
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stabilization and public pension funds do not transform into sovereign wealth funds 
immediately. I started the test with states that had established stabilization or public 
pension funds by 1987. By choosing 1987, the states had five years during the bull 
market of the late 1980s and the oil price spike associated with the Gulf War to grow its 
fund. 53 This method provides the greatest confidence that these funds were acting as 
sovereign wealth funds from the period 1992 to 2008. That left five states with sovereign 
wealth funds: Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Data for the occupational specialization difference in means test can be found in 
Table 5.1 on the next page. The results were mixed for industrial sector participation. 
The tests indicate that sovereign wealth funds increase male participation and decrease 
female participation in the industrial sector; however, neither of these variables was 
statistically significant. The p-value for Men in Industry was 0.457, while the p-value for 
Women in Industry was 0.393. The service sector tests revealed that a statistically 
significant relationship exists between sovereign wealth funds and participation in the 
service sector. Sovereign wealth funds are associated with an increase of 15.95 
percentage points for the Men in Services. This relationship was significant at the 95% 
confidence interval with a p-value of 0.025. For Women in Services, the increase in 
service sector participation was 32.99 percentage points. This relationship was 
statistically significant at the 98% confidence level with a p-value of 0.010. 
Extant literature on the resource curse and Dutch Disease assume that 
deindustrialization prevents democratization. The existing literature does not discuss 
how service sector jobs affect democratization. The large and statistically significant 
53 Shifting the cut-off point to 1990 does not add any additional states to the sample. 
Norway officially chartered its fund in 1990. 
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difference in means for service sector participation associated with sovereign wealth 
funds imply that these funds might bypass the industrialization stage and move directly to 
service oriented economies. I am not sure at this time how this particular pathway to 
economic modernization will affect regime outcomes. 
Table 5.1 Comparison of Means Test for Occupational Specialization 1992-2008 
n=40 
Sovereign Valid No Sovereign Valid 
Sig. 
Wealth Fund Cases Wealth Fund Cases 
Men in Industry 27.88 5 24.42 35 0.457 
Women in Industry 9.05 5 13.37 35 0.393 
Men in Services 63.16 5 47.21 35 0.025 
Women in Services 88.46 5 55.47 35 0.010 
Source: Independent samples t-test performed in SPSS 
MODEL 1: OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION 
Hypothesis two (H2) states: Greater levels of occupational specialization result in 
less authoritarian regimes in resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds 
compared to counterpart states without sovereign wealth funds. To test this claim, I 
added the occupational specialization variables to the base model described in Chapter 4. 
The model uses the pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset of states that I constructed. 
To control for multicollinearity between sovereign wealth funds and natural resources, I 
centered the variables by subtracting the means. The regression model is: 
Regimei,t = al + bl (Oili,t-s) + b2(Mineralsi,t_s) + b3(LogIncomei,t_s) + b4(Islami) + 
bs(Regimei,t-s) + b6(SWFi.t-s) + b7(Men in IndustrYi.t_s) + bg(Women in IndustrYi,t_s) + 
b9(Men in Servicesi,t_s) + blO(Women in Servicesi,t_s). 
I first ran the ARIMA model with the following independent variables: Oil, 
Minerals, Log Income, Islam, Regime, Men in Industry, Women in Industry, Men in 
Services, and Women in Services. After controlling for states that were already 
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democratic, there were 32 oil-reliant and 18 mineral-reliant states for the time period 
1970 to 2008. Five states were both oil-reliant and mineral-reliant. There were 45 
resource-reliant states. SPSS was able to use data on all but six of those states. See 
Appendix G and Appendix H for a break down of resource-reliant states from 1970 to 
2008. The results for the first occupational specialization regression can be found in 
Table 5.2. The industrial sector variables indicate that industrialization hinders 
democratization, while the service sector variables indicate that service sector 
participation promotes democratization. None of the four occupational variables 
remained statistically significant after adding the control variables to the equation. These 
findings bring into question the claim that occupational specialization remains necessary 
before democratization efforts can occur. 54 
Table 5.2 Occupational Specialization Regression I 
n=39 Coefficient Standard Error Sig. 
Oil -0.087 0.039 0.036 
Minerals 0.020 0.051 0.694 
Islam -2.248 1.395 0.119 
Log Income 1.797 1.657 0.288 
Lag Regime 0.670 0.116 0.000 
Men in Industry -0.061 0.062 0.340 
Women in Industry 0.009 0.064 0.887 
Men in Services -0.006 0.044 0.886 
Women in Services 0.011 0.035 0.745 
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The intent was to add the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund to the ARIMA model 
to see if the occupational specialization effect diminished in statistical significance after 
controlling for the presence of a sovereign wealth fund. Since occupational 
54 Another interesting finding that emerged from this regression is the positive and 
insignificant relationship between mineral exports and regime type. This suggests that 
the resource curse might apply to minerals beyond the Third Wave of Democratization. 
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specialization does not appear to influence regime type anymore, I included the variable 
Sovereign Wealth Fund to see if the occupational specialization variables increased in 
statistical significance. The results for this regression can be found in Table 5.3 on the 
next page. The new variable did not change the results, nor did adding the additional 
regional effect dummy variables. The results for the third regression can be found in 
Table 5.4 on the next page. The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund was not significant and 
the coefficient was still negative. There are two ways to interpret these results. The first 
is that sovereign wealth funds exert two counter effects on regime type. The first effect 
promotes authoritarian rule, as evidenced in the significant and negative correlation 
between sovereign wealth funds and regime type seen in the bivariate relationship. The 
second effect promotes democratization through occupational specialization. 
Table 5.3 Occupational Specialization Regression II 
n=39 Coefficient Standard Error Sig. 
Oil -0.086 0.042 0.049 
Minerals 0.020 0.052 0.706 
Islam -2.233 1.462 0.139 
Log Income 1.781 1.726 0.312 
Lag Regime 0.670 0.118 0.000 
Sovereign Wealth Fund -0.065 1.416 0.964 
Men in Industry -0.061 0.064 0.351 
Women in Industry 0.010 0.067 0.883 
Men in Services -0.006 0.045 0.890 
Women in Services 0.012 0.036 0.749 
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The comparison of means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds increase the 
labor participation in the service sector of the economy in resource-reliant states. The 
bivariate relationship also suggests that this should lead to less authoritarian rule. 
However, this scenario remains unlikely as both sovereign wealth funds and occupational 
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specialization lack statistical significance after controlling for oil and mineral exports. 
Therefore the second, more likely interpretation is that sovereign wealth funds do not 
affect regime type. Sovereign wealth funds are negatively correlated with regime type; 
however, the large drop in statistical significance that occurs after controlling for oil 
exports implies that resource exports are the real explanatory factor. 
Controlling for the regional variables Latin America, Middle East, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula as well as the variable Small States does not change 
the outcome. 55 The full results can be found in Table 5.4. The presence of sovereign 
wealth funds and occupational specialization remain insignificant determinants of regime 
type after controlling for regional effects. In fact, the only significant factor that affected 
regime type in this model was Lag Regime. Islam drops in statistical significance after 
controlling for the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa because of its high correlation 
with these regions. Even the variable Oil drops from significance. These results suggest 
that the entire resource curse premise should be reexamined. Perhaps an agent-based 
formal model might offer a better understanding of the unique regional characteristics of 
the resource curse than traditional regression models. 
55 The Latin America variable was added at the last minute. It was suggested by a 
professor on my committee. Thad Dunning (2008) published an article recently that 
suggests resources aid democratization efforts in Latin American states. 
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Table 5.4 Occupational Specialization Regression III 
n=39 Coefficient Standard Error Sig. 
Oil -0.084 0.049 0.103 
Minerals 0.007 0.058 0.900 
Islam -1.004 2.008 0.622 
Log Income 1.399 2.117 0.516 
Lag Regime 0.656 0.146 0.000 
Sovereign Wealth Fund -0.010 1.665 0.995 
Men in Industry -0.054 0.086 0.539 
Women in Industry 0.027 0.080 0.735 
Men in Services -0.005 0.051 0.918 
Women in Services 0.011 0.039 0.777 
Latin America -0.427 2.476 0.865 
Middle East -2.393 2.252 0.300 
Sub-Saharan -0.140 2.171 0.949 
Arabian Peninsula 1.054 2.534 0.682 
Small States -1.342 1.924 0.493 
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis 
POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY 
To test the claim that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds are more 
transparent than counterpart states without these funds, I first ran a separation of means 
test to see if the basic premise of this claim was true. The same definition for resource-
reliant states that I used to test occupational specialization was applied for this test. A 
full list of those states can be found in Appendix E and Appendix F. A resource-reliant 
state is any state where oil or mineral exports account for an average of 5% of the state's 
GDP over the time period 1992 and 2008. Oil and mineral export data was not available 
for 15 of the 190 UN member states, leaving a total of 175 states with at least one year of 
data. Consistent with the previous methodology, I deleted any state that was democratic 
in both 1992 and 2008. Of the remaining states, 31 states were oil-reliant and 14 were 
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mineral-reliant. After taking into account the five states that were both oil-reliant and 
mineral-reliant during this time period, this method left 40 resource-reliant states. 
I applied the same methodology that was utilized in the occupational 
specialization difference in means tests. I ran the test by comparing states that had 
established stabilization or public pension funds by 1987 against states that had not 
created funds by 1987. By choosing 1987, the states had five years during the bull 
market of the late 1980s and the oil price spike associated with the Gulf War to grow its 
fund capital above the levels needed for stabilization or pension obligations. This method 
provides the greatest confidence that these funds were truly acting as sovereign wealth 
funds from the period 1992 onward. That left five states with sovereign wealth funds: 
Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. I calculated a 
new variable called Mean Political Transparency by finding the mean transparency score 
of every state available from 1995 to 2008. The results for the comparison of means test 
suggest that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds have a Corruption 
Perception Index score 1.3072 points higher than counterpart states. This relationship 
was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level with a p-value of 0.024. In other 
words, I am 95% certain that we can reject the null hypothesis that sovereign wealth 
funds do not affect a state's transparency. 
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MODEL 2: POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY 
My third hypothesis (H3) is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds 
have lower corruption index scores compared to counterpart states without sovereign 
wealth funds. To test this claim, I employed the same base model with five control 
variables used to construct Modell. The variable Political Transparency was added to 
measure the antidemocratic effects associated with sovereign wealth funds. I also added 
the variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct Investment to control for any effect 
these factors may have on regime type. Data is available from 1995 to 2008. The 
regression model is: 
Regimei,t = al + bl (Oili,t-s) + b2(Mineralsi,t_s) + b3(Loglncomei.t-s) + b4(Islami) + 
bs(Regimei,t-s) + b6(SWFi.t-s) + b7(Political TransparencYi,t_s) + 
B8(Political Stabilityi.t_s) + b9(Foreign Direct Investment,t_s) 
I first ran the model with the following independent variables: Oil, Minerals, Log 
Income, Islam, Regime, Political Transparency, Political Stability, and Foreign Direct 
Investment. SPSS was able to use data on all 40 resource-reliant states for the years 1995 
to 2008. The results can be found in Table 5.6 on the next page. The regression offered 
several interesting results. Notably, the only three variables that were statistically 
significant were Islam and Lag Regime. Even the variable Oil drops its statistical 
significance after controlling for Political Transparency. This suggests that at least some 
of the antidemocratic effects of the oil resource curse occur as a result of decreased 
government transparency. I would argue that these results confirm the claim that 
sovereign wealth funds promote democratization by elevating political transparency; 
however, the Political Transparency variable was not statistically significant. Therefore, 
it appears that the central claim of this study has yet to be confirmed. The initial 
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regression model does not indicate that sovereign wealth funds produce less authoritarian 
regimes. 
Table 5.6 Political Transparency Regression I 
n=40 Coefficient Standard Error Sig. 
Oil 0.026 0.027 0.351 
Minerals 0.020 0.041 0.624 
Islam -3.100 0.994 0.004 
Log Income -0.749 1.008 0.463 
Lag Regime 0.902 0.086 0.000 
Political Transparency 0.306 0.349 0.389 
Political Stability 0.641 0.352 0.079 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.077 0.056 0.179 
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis 
I reran the model including the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund. The results can 
be found in Table 5.7 on the next page. The findings produce by the second political 
transparency regression did not change the results of the previous model. Islam and Lag 
Regime remained the only statistically significant variables. The Oil and Minerals 
variables both decrease in statistical significance, suggesting that sovereign wealth funds 
mitigate the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. Since both variables were not 
statistically significant in either regression model, we still cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that sovereign wealth funds have no effect on regime type. 
An interesting observation is that the variables Political Transparency and 
Political Stability both decrease in coefficient size and statistical significance after 
controlling for the presence of sovereign wealth funds. This implies that sovereign 
wealth funds are correlated with both, while the Political Transparency finding confirms 
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the difference in means test results.56 Since neither Political Transparency nor Political 
Stability were statistically significant, though, these results still disprove the central 
premise of the study that sovereign wealth funds produce less authoritarian regimes. 
Table 5.7 Political Transparency Regression II 
n=40 Coefficient Standard Error Sig. 
Oil 0.022 0.029 0.465 
Minerals 0.024 0.042 0.581 
Islam -3.228 1.067 0.005 
Log Income -0.686 1.038 0.514 
Lag Regime 0.897 0.088 0.000 
Sovereign Wealth Fund 0.393 1.076 0.717 
Political Transparency 0.279 0.362 0.448 
Political Stability 0.625 0.358 0.082 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.077 0.057 0.191 
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis 
To confirm these results, I reran the test one more time adding the regional effect 
variables. The results can be found in Table 5.8 on the next page.57 Islam and Lag 
Regime remained the only two statistically significant variables. The p-value for the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund variable declines after controlling for the regional effects, 
probably due to its high correlation with the Middle East. The third regression analysis 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that sovereign wealth funds affect regime type through 
either occupational specialization or by increasing political transparency. 
56 Further research needs to be done to determine the causality between sovereign wealth 
and political stability. The results only confirmed the assumption that the two were 
related. 
57 The variable Latin America was not included in this regression, because the sample did 
not contain any Latin American states. 
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Table 5.S Political Transparency Regression III 
n=40 Coefficient Standard Error Sig. 
Oil 0.031 0.035 0.382 
Minerals 0.028 0.045 0.537 
Islam -3.120 1.442 0.040 
Log Income -1.061 1.184 0.378 
Lag Regime 0.897 0.094 0.000 
Sovereign Wealth Fund 0.117 1.185 0.922 
Political Transparency 0.399 0.488 0.422 
Political Stability 0.630 0.393 0.122 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.078 0.064 0.231 
Middle East 0.910 1.584 0.570 
Sub-Saharan -0.030 1.066 0.977 
Arabian Peninsula -1.696 1.779 0.349 
Small States -1.308 1.369 0.349 
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis 
OVERVIEW 
This study did not confirm all of my original hypotheses; however, it did produce 
several substantive results. First, my analysis suggests that sovereign wealth funds 
promote occupational specialization, but only within the service sector. I also discovered 
that occupational specialization no longer affects regime type. Thus, increased 
occupational specialization beget by sovereign wealth funds cannot mitigate the 
antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. On a side-note, the models also call into 
question the mineral resource curse. The coefficient on the variable Minerals was 
positive and lacked statistical significance in all six regression models. Concerning the 
second claim, it appears that sovereign wealth funds increase political transparency, but 




This study surveyed the affects sovereign wealth funds exert on the state's 
domestic economy and political formation. Chapter two introduced the resource curse 
literature that laid the theoretical foundation for my claim that sovereign wealth funds 
mitigate the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. In chapter three, I defined the 
term sovereign wealth fund and proffered the argument that these funds promote 
occupational specialization and political transparency necessary for democratization. As 
a result, I hypothesized that resource-reliant states with these funds would have less 
authoritarian regimes than counterpart states. Using data available from the Polity IV 
project, Freedom House Index, World Bank, UNESCO, International Labour 
Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Christian Encyclopedia presented 
in chapter four, I explored the validity of the premises central to my argument and the 
resource curse literature in general. 
In chapter five, I further tested these hypotheses using difference in means tests 
and a regime-estimation ARIMA model. The central premise of the study was not 
confirmed. Sovereign wealth funds do not produce less authoritarian regimes. The 
comparison of means test lent credence to the claim that these funds generate 
occupational specialization within the state's service sector; however, the regime-
estimation model contradicts previous claims that elevating occupational specialization 
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encourages democratization.58 I must therefore conclude that sovereign wealth funds 
cannot foster democratization by increasing occupational specialization. 
Tentative support exists for the second claim that sovereign wealth funds abet 
political transparency. The difference in means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds 
encourage political transparency. The regime-estimation model failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that elevated levels of political transparency affect regime type in resource-
reliant states. These results mirror those of the occupational specialization claim: 
sovereign wealth funds promote political transparency, but a more open government does 
not yield democratization in resource-reliant states. I must also caution that the data 
available merely allowed me to test the affect the presence of sovereign wealth funds had 
on political transparency. The exact nature of this relationship provided in the theory 
section was not confirmed and remains a theoretical speculation about the relationship 
between political transparency and sovereign wealth funds. 
METHODOLOGICAL SHORTFALLS 
Missing data was the major problem that plagued my research. The lack of 
annual data for occupational specialization and absent information about the internal 
structures and operations of sovereign wealth funds were an issue that hindered the 
58 Ross recently reached the same conclusion in a soon to be released article titled Oil and 
Democracy Revisited. In the paper, Ross concludes that the rentier effect is the only 
causal mechanism of the resource curse. The article has not been published yet; however, 
advance copies of it are available from several recent conferences and presentations. The 
paper was presented at the following conferences: the Rand Institute's International 
Development Speakers Series, University of California's International Relations Speaker 
Series, Georgetown University Government Department's speaker series, the University 
of Pennsylvania's Political Science speaker series, and Yale University's Leitner 
Seminar. 
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results of this study. The World Bank and International Labour Organization compile 
occupational specialization data from information found in state census forms and 
national educational surveys. Since censuses are not typically performed annually, these 
organizations consult educational surveys to provide annual data points for the years in 
between census. The problem with this method is that annual education surveys are not 
typically available for developing states prior to the 1990s and for many less developed 
states until the last decade. That creates a problem for resource curse research. Using 
pooled time series cross-sectional data help alleviate this problem; however, an ideal 
study would still include more annual data points to better measure the effect of 
sovereign wealth funds over time. 
Another general problem inherently associated with studying sovereign wealth 
funds is the opaque nature of fund operations. Without knowing the exact amount of 
capital available, investment strategies, and fund structure, researchers can only make 
general observations of sovereign wealth funds and the effect these funds expend on 
global financial markets and domestic economies. More precisely, this study could only 
focus on how the presence of sovereign wealth funds affected occupational specialization 
and political transparency. The missing data thus became a limiting factor in my 
statistical analysis in that the true size of the democratizing effect of sovereign wealth 
funds cannot be determined. 
Finally, using the OLS linear regression analysis with panel-corrected standard 
errors and lagged variables created by Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz may appear 
parsimonious to more established political methodologists; however, my belief is that this 
methodology should adequately serve the statistical needs of this thesis and produce 
87 
efficient and reliable estimates. The Beck and Katz method has gained wide-spread 
acceptance among econometricians over the past decade. Although, I will admit that a 
more sophisticated approaches such as the feasible generalized least squares regression 
used by Michael Ross or Kmenta's "cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise 
autocorrelated" (CRT A) model remain more widely accepted than OLS regression 
analysis with panel-corrected standard errors among political methodologists (Kmenta, 
1986; Beck and Katz, 1996; Ross, 2001).59 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
I plan to revisit this study in several years, because missing information on the 
operations and size of sovereign wealth funds will be made available in the near future. 
Park Alpha, the creator of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, recently announced the 
upcoming release of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Transaction Database that includes a 
complete list of financial transactions conducted by every sovereign wealth fund from 
1986 to 2010. Access to that data will allow future researchers to estimate the annual 
growth rate of capital appreciation experienced by individual sovereign wealth fund over 
a twenty-five year time period. That data can be used to determine how much capital 
actually flows out of these funds into the domestic economy of the states that create them, 
59 Kmenta' s CRT A model uses generalized least squares to correct for panel 
heteroskedasticity and serially correlated errors (Kmenta, 1986; Beck and Katz, 1996). 
This method has remained popular among political scientists; however, it does not appear 
to produce more accurate results than then the Beck and Katz method and requires a 
much greater level of mathematical sophistication (Beck and Katz, 1996). CRT A also 
proves less effective when contemporaneous correlation of errors is present in the model 
(Beck and Katz, 1996). 
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which will allow me to measure the true effect of sovereign wealth fund reinvestments on 
occupational specialization. 
As I stated earlier, the lack of available data complicated my investigation of the 
occupational specialization claim. Currently information only exists for years when 
census or survey data is available. Surveys to collect this data have routinely been 
conducted in developed states since the 1960s; however, routine surveys collecting this 
data only emerged in the past decade for developing states. The limited information 
available for these states in the pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset means 
definitive claims about occupational specialization and sovereign wealth funds are more 
difficult to make. Significantly more data will become available over the next decade as 
nascent sovereign wealth funds mature and survey usage increases. Enough data should 
be available in the next decade to include most of the state excluded in this study. Thus 
future statistical analysis of these claims will be inherently more valid than this study. 
Also, the political transparency argument will need to be revisited in the future to 
account for any new laws and regulations that are likely to emerge. The European 
Central Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States Treasury Department, 
and World Bank have all issued press releases calling for the creation of generally 
accepted principles and practices (GAPP) for sovereign wealth funds in order to improve 
the transparency of fund investment objectives and operations (Truman, 2007; IWG, 
2008; Kalter and Holt, 2010; Truman, 2010). These actions lead to the formation of the 
International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds at a meeting in 
Washington D.C. that took place on April 30 to May 1,2008 (IWG 2008; Kalter and 
Holt, 2010). 
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It was determined at this meeting that Hamad Al HUff Al Suwaidi, the 
Undersecretary of the Abu Dhabi Finance Department, and Jaime Caruana, the Director 
of Monetary and Capital Markets Department at the IMF would co-chair a panel of 
twenty-eight representatives charged with drafting a set of GAPP for sovereign wealth 
funds (IWG, 2008; Kalter and Holt, 2010; Truman, 2010).60 The IWG has met three 
times since then. The first meetings in Singapore and Oslo, Norway set the agenda for 
the third meeting in Santiago, Chile where a rough draft of the group's GAPP plan was 
finalized (IWG, 2008; Truman, 2010). 
Currently the Santiago Principles, as the GAPP has been named, are circulating 
among member states for comments and revisions (Truman, 2010). No deadline has been 
set for the completion of this process; however, several comments from member states 
have been publicly released. The Peterson Institute for International Economics recently 
released an index that measures the level of adherence to the Santiago Principles 
exhibited by various sovereign wealth funds (Truman, 2010). This scorecard showed 
widespread adherence to the principles by nearly all member states, which suggests that 
the Santiago Principles may officially enter the global financial structure in the near 
future. Full scale implementation of the Santiago Principles by sovereign wealth fund 
managers might promote greater levels of political transparency in the future than these 
funds encouraged in the past. 
60 The panel of twenty-eight members includes one representative each from twenty-three 
different states with sovereign wealth funds and five permanent observers. The states 
with sovereign wealth funds on the board are: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, 
Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Korea, 
Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, 
Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. The permanent 
observers are: Oman, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, the OECD, and the World Bank. Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam all possess sovereign wealth funds. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
My thesis remained true to the form established by previous resource curse 
scholars by raising nearly as many questions as it answered. Despite the unexpected 
results of this study, it still contributed important insights into the micro level effects of 
sovereign wealth funds. We learned that sovereign wealth funds foster occupational 
specialization, albeit only in the service sector of the economy. The findings also suggest 
that occupational specialization no longer appears to be a causal mechanism for the 
resource curse, so any attempts to boost labor force participation should not be expected 
to encourage democratization. Unrelated to the central purpose of this study, we also 
discovered that the resource curse does not appear to exist for mineral wealth anymore. 
The findings also offer tentative support for the claim that sovereign wealth funds induce 
political transparency for resource-reliant states relative to counterpart states, but only if 
the government was authoritarian when the fund was created. 
Currently the limited sample size of sovereign wealth fund states before 1990 
inhibits the creation of valid generalizable theory about sovereign wealth funds and 
political transparency. In other words, my analysis can only confirm what happened in 
the past and should not be used to speculate what will happen in the future. Release of 
Park Alpha's Sovereign Wealth Fund Transaction Database will soon bring public the 
data necessary to determine the true relationship between sovereign wealth funds and 
political transparency. Gaining a fuller understanding of this relationship would allow 
researchers to determine if there is something unique about the way certain sovereign 
wealth funds are managed that leads to political transparency. This data may also 
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provide key insights that will allow me to generalize between states, which the current 
method does not. 
Following the tradition established by Ross, I plan to revisit this study in another 
decade. I believe this is necessary because three events will occur over the next decade 
that could challenge these conclusions. First, recently created stabilization and public 
pension plans should have enough time to mature by the year 2020 to test this claim for a 
wider variety of stats. Of course, these funds might also disprove the generalizability of 
my theory by proving that the promotion of political transparency was .limited to the 
original states. Second, the passage of time will also allow me to test what affect the 
original sovereign wealth funds have over two full oil price cycles. Finally, widespread 
implementation of the Santiago Principles could promote political transparency via 
sovereign wealth funds in a way that this thesis could not predict. 
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List of Sovereign Wealth Funds A-S 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Name 
Revenue Regulation Fund 
Australian Future Fund 
State Oil Fund 
Mumtalakat Holding Company 
Pula Fund 
Sovereign Fund of Brazil 
Brunei Investment Agency 
Social and Economic Stabilization Fund 
SAFE Investment Company 
National Social Security Fund 
China Investment Corporation 
China-Africa Development Fund 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio 
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 
Strategic Investment Fund 
Government Investment Unit 
Oil Stabilisation Fund 
National Pensions Reserve Fund 
Kazakhstan National Fund 
Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 
Kuwait I nvestment Authority 
Libyan Investment Authority 
Khazanah Nasional 
National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
Excess Crude Account 
Government Pension Fund - Global 
State General Reserve Fund 
Oman Investment Fund 
Qatar Investment Authority 
National Welfare Fund 
Public Investment Fund 
SAMA Foreign Holdings 
Temasek Holdings 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
Korea Investment Corporation 
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Country 
Trinidad & Tobago 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) 
UAE (Dubai) 
UAE (Federal) 
UAE (Ras AI Khaimah) 
Venezuela 
Appendix A 
List of Sovereign Wealth Funds T -V 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Name 
Heritage and Stabilization Fund 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
International Petroleum Investment Company 
Mubadala Development Company 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council 
Investment Corporation of Dubai 
Emirates Investment Authority 
RAK Investment Authority 
FEM 
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Institute 
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Appendix B 
Data for Sovereign Wealth Fund Dummy Variable 
Country Sovereign Wealth Fund Name Inception 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 2000 
Australia Australian Future Fund 2004 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 1999 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 2006 
Botswana Pula Fund 1994 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil 2009 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 1983 
Chile Social and Economic Stabilization Fund 1985 
China SAFE Investment Company 1997 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 2005 
France Strategic Investment Fund 2008 
Indonesia Government Investment Unit 2006 
Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund 1999 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund 2001 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 2000 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 1956 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 1953 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 2006 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 1993 
Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 2006 
New Zealand New Zealand Superannuation Fund 2003 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account 2004 
Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 1990 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 1980 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 2005 
Russia National Welfare Fund 2008 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund 2008 
Singapore Govt. of Singapore Investment Corporation 1981 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation 2005 
Trinidad & Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 2000 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976 
Venezuela FEM 1998 
Vietnam Stat~ Capital Investment Corporation 2006 




Industrial Activity Used to Create 
Men in Industry and Women in Industry Variables 
Industrial Activity ISIC, ISCE 1958 ISCE 1993 revision 4 
Mining and Quarrying Category B Catgeory 2 Category C 
Manufacturing Category C Catgeory 3 Category 0 
Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning Category 0 Catgeory 4 Category E 
Water supply including sewerage, waste 
Category E Catgeory 4 Category E management, and remediation services 
Construction Category F Catgeory 5 Category F 
Source: International Labour Organization and World Bank 
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AppendixD 
Service Sector Activity Used to Create 
Men in Services and Women in Services Variables 
Service Sector Activity 
Wholesale and retail trade including repair of motor vehicles 
Transportation and storage 
Accommodation and food service activities 
Information and communication 
Financial and insurance activities 
Real estate activities 
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 
Administrative and support service activities 
Public admin. and defense including compulsory social security 
Education 
Human health and social work activities 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation and other service activities 
Other service activities 
Household act. and production of undifferentiated goods/services 
Service Sector Activity 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motor sales 
Hotels and restaurants 
Transport, storage and communications 
Financial intermediation 
Real estate, renting and business activities 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
Education 
Health and social work 
Other community, social and personal service activities 
Households with employed persons 
Service Sector Activity 
Commerce 
Transport, storage, and communication 
Services 
Source: International Labour Organization and World Bank 
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Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
United Arab Emirates 
Vietnam 
Yemen, Republic of 
Appendix E 
Oil-Reliant States: 1992 to 2008 
Notes 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 















United Arab Emirates 
Zambia 
Appendix F 
Mineral-Reliant States: 1992 to 2008 
Notes 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 































United Arab Emirates 
Appendix G 
Oil-Reliant States: 1970 to 2008 
Notes 
Data Missing 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Data Missing 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Data Missing 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 
Vietnam 







Mineral-Reliant States: 1970 to 2008 
Notes 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 












United Arab Emirates 
Zambia 
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Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Data Missing 
Data Missing 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
Data Missing 
Oil and Mineral Reliant 
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